586 ORAL ARGUMENT OF CHRISTOPHER ROBINSON, Q. C. 



Xow, wliat I desire to do is to call attention to tlie propositions 

 which they themselves put — and I think I have referred the Tribunal to 

 the pages at whieh they are found — as showing (and for that we are 

 indebted to them) clearly and detinitely the grounds on which they rest 

 their claim to property. They are pages 47, 50, 91 and 132. I have 

 attached great importance to these propositions as so stated, and I 

 think they are not stated differently on these diflerent pages, but that 

 they substantially result in the same proposition. 1 attach importance 

 to them for this reason; that I cannot but believe, looking at it as if I 

 had drawn it myself, that those propositions are an attempt on the 

 part of Mr. Carter and Mr. Phelps so to put their claims as to steer 

 clear of all tliose principles of municipal law based on the analogy ot 

 other animals which they must feel had to be overcome. 



We have then to ascertain — and I try first to confine myself to these 

 claims based on municipal law — are those propositions true in fact? 

 and if they are true in fact would they sustain the claim in law? I 

 would desire to refer first to page 47, in which I think there is as 

 much that is open to comment as on any other similar page in any 

 other legal controversy that it has ever been my lot to see I refer to 

 the printed argument of the United States. They say that according 

 to the doctrines which they have adverted to, which are doctrines 

 taken from Blackstone and Bracton, the essential facts which render 

 animals. 



commonly designated as wild the subjects of property, not only while in the actual 

 custody of their masters, but also when temporarily absent there from, are. — 



what they go on to state. Now I understand them to say, in sub- 

 stance, that what they are going to state practicalh' renders animals 

 which would otherwise be regarded as aniqpals ferce naturw animals of 

 the domestic class or which have been tamed or reclaimed. I need 

 hardly, of course, point out that there are three classes of animals — 

 one domestic beyond doubt, which are born domestic and continue so; 

 then there are animals ferce naturce, born of that nature and continu- 

 ing of that nature; and then animals ferce naturce which by the act 

 and conduct of man have had their nature so changed that they have 

 been taken out of the class of wild animals and i^laced in the class of 

 domestic animals. With regard to those animals they continue in the 

 latter class only so long as their change of nature remains. We all 

 know this, and I do not desire to delay the Tribunal in discussing 

 elementary matters. I only refer to it to show how I view their propo- 

 sition. Now they first say — 



the care and industry of man acting upon a natural disposition of the animals to 

 return to a place of wonted resort secures their voluntary and habitual return to his 

 custody and power. 



Now let me ask, is that statement as applied to the seals founded in 

 fact. Has it a shadow of foundation in fact? I think I may test that 

 by this simple proposition. Is it possible to say that you secure a cer- 

 tain course of conduct by your act when, as a matter of fact, that result 

 would have been more certainly secured, or at least as certainly secured, 

 if you had done nothing. 



Now that is putting it shortly, is it not putting it conclusively — Is 

 there any answer to it? Can it be said that I secure something by 

 what I do when that thing would have certainly happened if I had done 

 nothing and had not been near the place. There is no logic in saying 

 that a certain consequence happens from a certain cause, if the conse- 

 quence would have happened without the cause. Would those seals 



