ORAL ARGUMENT OF CHRISTOPHER ROBINSON, Q. C. 587 



have returned if the United States had done notliiTig. Does anybody 

 doubt it? If they wouhl, how is it possible to say that the United 

 States liave secured the return? 



Now that seems a short argument; but is there any answer to it? If 

 animals are coming, and I know they are coming, and I get out of their 

 way when I see them coming, in order to make certain that they will 

 come, does anything I do secure their coming except my getting out of 

 their way? Do the United States do anything more? Is it possible to 

 say that they do anything more? If they showed themselves visibly, the 

 seals would not come— we all know that. So much for this assertion. 



Can it be said, with any show of reason, — I do not desire to enter 

 into nice arguments, — can it be asserted, with any shadow of reason, 

 that they secure their return? Let me ask, if there are other seals (and 

 the illustration has been put before), as there well may be, for our 

 knowledge is not complete — if there are other seals which resort to 

 other Islands not yet known, as these seals do to the Pi-ibilof Islands, 

 what does man do on the Pribilof Islands, to secure their return to 

 these Islands, that is not done on the other Islands to secure their 

 return to those Islands? If they return to those Islands by the imperi- 

 ous, unchangeable instincts of their nature, as they return to the 

 Pribilof Islands, has man any share whatever in securing their return? 

 Unless it can be answered in the affirmative, our proposition is com- 

 plete. Can it be? 



If man were to disappear from the face of the earth, and leave the 

 Pribilof Islands, it would be more certain that the seals would return 

 than it is now, because it is just possible that something done by man 

 might frighten some of them away. 



Then the next statement we have is: that man secures their volun- 

 tary and habitual return to his custody and power. When you speak 

 of securing the voluntary return of a wild animal — and for the present 

 I am assuming they are wild animals though I know there is an indi- 

 cation throughout their case that they are domestic animals, either 

 domestic animals by nature or because they are reclaimed— but assum- 

 ing for a moment they are wild animals, what is the meaning of saying 

 that they voluntarily return to the custody of man ? 



It either means nothing, or it means that they knowingly return 

 knowing that man is there and wishing to be in his custody, just as a 

 wild animal, reclaimed and tamed by me, returns to my custody and 

 power, because I have induced it so to do by the expectation of food or 

 something else which he can get from me. Numerous instances may be 

 put. Suppose I have on my land a den of bears or any other wild 

 animal — I do not care whether it is bears, pheasants, or rabbits. It is 

 very possible that the bear may be returning and that he would not 

 return if he saw me, but does return because I keep out of his way. 

 Can I be said to secure his return ? Can I be said to secure the return 

 of the pheasant or rabbit? Much more can it, I think, be said there, 

 because they would not return either to the preserves where pheasants 

 are kept, or to warrens where rabbits are kept, in some cases, unless I 

 provided food for them. 



There may be in addition other inducements, such as shelter, or some 

 other inducement ered to return, which is offered by me. There is 

 absolutely nothing done on the Pribilof Islands; so that when you 

 talk of securing the voluntary return to their custody and power, it is 

 not by acting upon their instinct. I should have i)erhaps referred to 

 that first — for the proposition is that by acting on a natural disposition 

 of the animals he secures their return. How does man act on a natural 

 disposition of the animal at all? 



