588 ORAL ARGUMENT OF CHRISTOPHER ROBINSON, Q. C. 



Again, I put a similar proposition to what I put before. He does not 

 act upon their natural disposition in any way. On the contrary, he 

 abstains from interfering with their natural disposition. He leaves 

 their disposition to its own natural operation; and because he does not 

 interfere with its action, because he does not prevent them from acting 

 in accordance with it, he is said to act on their natural disposition. 

 Now, I take it that "to act upon" there means something positive, — 

 it must mean doing something to affect their natural disposition and 

 to induence it. W hat man does is carefully to avoid interfering with 

 their natural disposition, and to leave their natural disY)Osition to its nat- 

 ural operation. If he did nothing, their natural disposition would secure 

 their return. How can it be said then that he acts on their natural 

 disposition? All that he does is to leave it to act by itself. Then if 

 that is correct and accurate, the proposition, be it right or wrong, 

 sound or unsound, well founded or ill founded, is so simple, that there 

 can be no question about it. 



If I am right in saying, that in either of those cases can you say he 

 either secures their return or acts on their natural disposition, then 

 that proposition is not true in fact. I mean it is not supported by the 

 facts. Man neither does act on their natural disposition nor does he 

 secure their return to his custody and power; on the contrary, if these 

 animals knew that they were returning to man's custody and power 

 they would not return. If the wild animal who comes on my land, to 

 his den, knew I was there he would not return. It is because he does 

 not know I am there that he does return: and if I were to show myself 

 he would not return. How then can I be said, in any reasonable sense 

 or use of language, either to act on their natural disposition, or to 

 secure their return? If we are right it is impossible to assert that 

 either of these things is done in the case of the seal; and, of course, the 

 natural inference must be that this proposition is not supported in its 

 application to these animals by the actual facts of the case; and it falls, 

 therefore, without reference to law, because we have not the facts to 

 which to apply the law. 



Then it is said that having acted upon their disposition so as by that 

 means to secure their return, it is done "so as to enable him to deal 

 with them in a similar manner, and to obtain from them similar benefits, 

 as in the case of domestic animals:" It is "the nature and habits of 

 the animal which enable man by the practice of art, care, and industry 

 to bring about these useful results that constitute the foundation upon 

 which the law makes it award of property." 



I^ow I venture to think, first, that he does not act on these natural- 

 instincts at all: and next, that if he did act on them, he would be 

 doing only what every hunter does in the pursuit of wild game; and 

 what is the invariable course pursued by all people who wish to get 

 wild animals within their power; in other words, what are the invari- 

 able devices of the hunter? I can conceive many cases in which man 

 does act on the natural instinct of wild animals, and in which he 

 secures their return, or in which he secures their coming and submit- 

 ting themselves to his power. I will take an ordinary case and put the 

 illustration — I do not wish by any means to be extreme. The natural 

 instinct of the wild duck is to light with its fellows. I act on this instinct 

 by putting dummy fellows on the water, and I hide behind something 

 to get out of the way. I am acting on their instinct there, so as to 

 induce them voluntarily to come to the decoys and submit themselves 

 to my power, and when they get within range I shoot them, and secure 

 the useful result. Is not that the case with every wild animal? — I do 



