598 ORAL ARGUMENT OF CHRISTOPHER ROBINSON, Q. C. 



If it comes witliin any of those classes it must come withia the class 

 of reclaimed animals. That is to say it is temporarily in that class. I 

 do not know how else I can pat it. I may say that there was a case 

 reported only the other day — possibly it may have attracted the atten- 

 tion of some members of tlie Tribunal — in which the question of the 

 length of time that is necessary to confine a wild animal in order to 

 bri]ig' it in that class came up. It is perhaps known to some of the 

 Tribunal that there is a law in England for the prevention of cruelty 

 to domestic animals; and the Humane Society proceeded against per- 

 sons who were carrying on in some of the northern counties the game 

 of rabbit coursing. It was said that these rabbits had been kept for a 

 week or ten days in confinement prior to turning them out to course, 

 and that they had thereby become domestic animals. Mr. Justice 

 Wright held that he could not possibly say that that made them 

 domestic animals; and the pajier, which seemed to agree with that, 

 said they feared there was no doubt that the decision was correct, but 

 they wished it could be otherAvise. 



The President. — Do you think a hived bee would fall under that 

 law? 



Lord Hannen. — I do not think cruelty to animals is extended to bees. 



Mr. KoBiNSON. — I do not think it is; though I am afraid they are 

 subject to a great deal of cruelty very often in order to get at their honey. 



I pass then to those propositions which my learned friends assert are 

 founded either on international law or the law of nature; and so far 

 as I can understand they are the same. I find that what my learned 

 friends assert in substance, if I can properly state it in substance, is 

 that international law is founded upon the law of nature. Differ- 

 ing from the view of the learned Attorney General, they say that 

 whatever part of the law of nature is not rejected in international law 

 may fairly be presumed to be assented to, and therefore that anything 

 they can say comes within the law of nature, if you cannot discover 

 that international law has rejected it or dissented from it, forms part of 

 international law. I venture to say that is contrary to all theories 

 upon which international lawhas hitherto been founded. But we may at 

 all events take for a moment the different propositions which they found 

 upon that. They go at great length into a discussion or disquisition of 

 the original principles and foundation of the institution of property, 

 from which they deduce certain principles. I can only say of those prin- 

 ciples that they find no place in the municipal law of any portion of the 

 civilized world. They may be valuable abstract discussions. They may 

 be very useful ^Speculative theories for the guidance and assistance of 

 those who are making laws, in order to decide how far it is advisable, 

 how far it is practicable, to make their municipal law conform to them; 

 in other words, how much of the principles laid down and enunciated 

 by these authors as part of what they are pleased to term the law of 

 nature, it is practicable or useful or desirable to incorporate into their 

 municipal law. For any other purpose I venture to say that they are 

 absolutely useless, because not only are they not founded on any 

 positive system of either municipal or international law, but they are 

 theories which it would be utterly impossible to incorporate into any 

 system of laws with a view to carrying them out. 



Let me for a moment turn to the first assertion which is made — and 

 I think it is perhaps a tyi^ical assertion — with regard to this property, 

 founded upon that law. They assert that they are trustees : That this 

 property is not their own, that they are trustees of it for the civilized 

 world, and are conferring upon the civilized world the blessings which 



