616 ORAL ARGUMENT OF CHRISTOPHER ROBINSON, Q. C. 



families by what I believe to be and what I have no hesitation in say- 

 ing is a respectable employment — when you charge these men with all 

 the crimes of the Decalogue, we have the right to turn to the conduct 

 of those by whom the charge is made; and ask if it lies in their mouth 

 to make it. I venture to say it does not. 



I do not think, Mr. President, that there are any other topics which, 

 in the view 1 have taken of this case — (the only view, as I said in the 

 beginning, in wliich it seemed to me I could be of any possible use to 

 the Tribunal) — it seems necessary for me to make. Kecurring again to 

 what 1 ventured to say with regard to International Arbitrations at the 

 opening of my argument, I may add that when nations snb)nit to a 

 Tribunal of this character their rights, they mean their rights to be 

 determined by law, and they mean a defi"nite certain law which can 

 be found by anyone laid down somewhere — a law, which may afford a 

 sensible guide in the conduct of human affairs — not theories, not spec- 

 ulations, not the opinions of metaphysicians as to what the law ought 

 to be, and as to what it would be well to make it, or what the law would 

 be if human nature were changed; but their rights are to be deter- 

 mined by the law as we find it, which I take it is always, and on all 

 occasions, the embodiment of what nations believe to be right and 

 desirable, and what in practice can be enforced. We believe this claim, 

 judged by these common sense principles, fails altogether, and we sub- 

 mit there is no reasonable ground — no legal ground — upon which the 

 United States can claim either a property in these animals or an indus- 

 try which they have a right to protect. 



I do not desire to add any remarks upon the question of the right of 

 protection, and merely for this reason: in the first place it has been 

 very thoroughly discussed, and in the next place I entirely agree, if I 

 may venture to say so, with what my learned friend the Attorney Gen- 

 eral has said. If it is their property, we have to respect it; and it is 

 very little use (except as regards the past, and the seizures) to discuss 

 it further. If they have a right of i)rotection, or if they own the seals, 

 their property and their right will have to be respected. 



As regards the right to condemn and to seize vessels, I do not profess 

 to be very familiar with the subject, but I should have thought it was 

 absolutely clear that condemnation and seizure were things which can 

 be enforced only by some positive maritime law. If a vessel of any 

 nation, for instance, were to come to a port of England and steal some 

 government property, it is inconceivable that there would be any right 

 to follow that vessel, seize her, bring her in, and condemn her — condemn 

 a vessel of the value of £10,000 because she had stolen £10 worth of 

 property! You could only do that under some international law which 

 gives the right according to the law of nations; and this can never be 

 except in the case of piracy, or under some municipal law — some valid 

 law — within the territory of the nation in fact, and which therefore can 

 be enforced. 



That, Mr. President, is all I think I can add with any hope of being 

 of the least use; and I can only thank the Tribunal for the patience 

 with Avhich they have listened to what I am ])erfectly well aware must 

 have been, to a large extent, repetition. 



The President. — Mr. Kobinson, we think you have made very good 

 use of what you were i)leased to call (with I think excessive modesty) 

 the scrai)s and leavings of j'our leaders; indeed you have made very 

 good work from those, and we are thankful for it. 



Sir EiCHARD Webster. — If General Foster will forgive me for a 

 moment I want to refer to the statutes. Mr. Carter was good enough, 



