ARGUMENT OF GREAT BRITAIN. 55 



jurisdiction advanced in the present case by the United 

 States; and this absence of consent, or acquiescence, is 

 fatal to a chiini which involves the right of vsearch and 

 seizure on the higli sea outside territorial waters, and, 

 consequently, a violation or limitation of the freedom of 

 the sea. 



" The 8t. Helena Act, 1815." 



At the peace of 1815 it was determined by Great Britain, 

 in conjunctiou with the allied Powers, that St. Helena 

 should be the place allotted for the residence of the Em- 

 peror Napoleon Bonaparte, under such regulations as might 

 be uecessary for the perfect security of his person; 



62 and it was resolved that, for this purpose, all ships 

 whatever, British and foreign, excepting only the 



East India Company's ships, should be excluded from all 

 approach to the island. Notice was accordingiv given by American state 

 the British Charge d'Affaires at Washington to the United j);'!;^;''^' ^"*- ^^• 

 States Government on the 24th November, 1815, that a 

 Treaty t)f Commerce between Great Britain and the United 

 States, dated the 3rd July, 1815, under Article III of which 

 liberty of touching for refreshment at the island was given 

 to United States vessels, could not be carried out in this 

 respect; and that the ratitications of the Treaty would be 

 exchanged underthe explicit declaration that United States 

 vessels could not be allowed to touch at, or hold any com- 

 munication whatever with, the island, so long as it should 

 continue to be tlie residence of the Emperor. The Treaty 

 was ratified on this understanding. 



The arrangement made for the general safety received 

 the consent, express or implied, of all nations. If any 

 aiuilogy can be found between that case and the one now 

 under discussion, it goes to show that the United States 

 cannot exclude other nations from the seal fishery without 

 a lilie consent. 



« The Quarantine Act, 1825." 



This Act depends u] )on the principles already adverted 

 to with regard to the Hovering Acts. 



It is submitted that no one of these three Acts affords 

 any analogy or justification for a jurisdiction based merely 

 on protection of trade, and claimed and exercised many 

 hundred miles in open seas. 



GENERAL CONCLUSION ON THIS BRANCH OF THE CASE. 



Therefore, it is submitted that the assertion that the 

 practice of nations supports the United States contention 

 in regard to their claim to pro])erty in, and protection of, 

 the seals in the high sea, is witliout foundation. 



If it is regarded as an assum])ti()n of jurisdiction on the 



high sea, it was entirely beyond the power of the United 



States Congress to [)ass an Act applying to foreign- 



63 ers; for, without ac(juiescence of other nations, and 

 without example in the juactice of other nations, it 



infringes the rights of those nations upon the high seas. 



