ARGUMENTS ON PRELIMINARY MOTIONS. 81 



tnied yesterday to point out marks also a division in tbe character of 

 the functions that this Tribunal lias to perform, tliey are according to 

 the contention of my learned friend to be mixed together and not as we 

 contend to be kept distinct. 



Well now it is said that we claim two hearings, two awards, two 

 Arbitrations, and all the rest of it. Well I will not say that this is 

 nonsense, because that would not be respectful, but my friend cannot 

 snppose that we mean anything of the kind. We mean that this Arbi- 

 tration, that this Tribunal, having heard the discussion of the questions 

 of right and the evidence, from whatever source it is to be derived 

 applicable to those questions of right, shall proceed to state their con- 

 clusion, — if that be their conclusion as to all those questions, — that 

 their determination of those five questions is such as in their opinion 

 to require the concurrence of Great Britain in Eegulations within the 

 meaning of Article VII, and, thereupon, my friends are to proceed to 

 justify their claim for Eegulations by such evidence as is relevant to 

 that topic, and we are to meet their case by such argument and by ref- 

 erence to such evidence as is relevant to the same topic. It does not 

 involve two awards; it does not involve two Arbitrations; it involves 

 the simple act of keeping distinct and separate things which are in their 

 nature distinct and separate. It involves no additional expenditure of 

 time, and, although I said yesterday, and I wish to retract nothing 

 that I said yesterday, that I thought this Tribunal would be reluctant 

 to close the door against any important fact that might even recently 

 have transpired which had an impoitant bearing upon what ought to 

 be the judgment of the Tribunal in the exercise of its discretion on the 

 question of Eegulations, I did not thereby mean to hold out to this 

 Tribunal, or to suggest to this Tribunal, that we had any or the least 

 idea of offering such volume of evidence as my words might seem to 

 have suggested. Our case substantially is, as to Eegulations and as to 

 everything else, before this Court, with the exce])tion of this Supple- 

 mentary Eeport. We think it is irregularly before this Tribunal; and 

 we have only yielded to the irregularity in order that there might be 

 no ground for suggesting that there was a grievance on the part of the 

 United States; and it was in deference to the suggestion of the United 

 States itself, and contrary to the view which the advisers of the Gov- 

 ernment took that Lord Eosebery yielded to the objection of the United 

 States, and furnished to the representatives of the United States, to be 

 treated as part of our Case, tlie British Commissioners' Eeport. This 

 Eeport which we propose to jjut in evidence is supplementary to that. 

 And two questions, of course, arise in relation to it; and to those two 

 questions I should like to address one word, and one word only. I mean 

 the point thrown out by the President yesterday as to the word " evi- 

 dence" appearing in Article VII. 



But before I do that may I be allowed for one moment to recur again 

 to a point which I made yesterday. My learned friend Mr. Phelps 

 complained and made it a matter of grievance; and of course it is a 

 great thing to get hold of a grievance if you can. A grievance is almost 

 as good as a sound argument at times before some tribunals. My 

 learned friend wants to get hold of a grievance, and he says: We have 

 reason to complain also that even upon the question of property and 

 property rights, and protection in relation to property rights dealt with 

 under point 5 of article VI— why even on that point, says my learned 

 friend, even on that point the Government of the Queen really do not 

 tell us what their case Is at all. I^ow I think it is important that it 

 should be shown that there is really no foundation for this complaint. 

 B s, PT XI (> 



