88 ARGUMENTS ON PRELIMINARY MOTIONS. 



If his observations had stopped there I should not have thoujjht it 

 worth while to say anything; but he continued, and perhaps this was 

 the purpose for which he introduced the observation : 



I am quite sure that there are many propositions put forward in the argument 

 which I have had the ]deasure of reading, presented by the United States, which I 

 should be sorry, and I think my learned Mends themselves would he sorry to commit 

 themselves to as approving lawjers. 



Of course I can say nothing as to the rule which learned counsel 

 may i^rescribe for themselves in addressing a judicial tribunal. The 

 intimation is that the opinions we express here and the arguments we 

 address to the Tribunal should not be regarded as our real opinions, 

 or as not necessarily so, but as simple suggestions which may be made, 

 and which are submitted to the Tribunal without any expression what- 

 ever as to whether counsel believe in them or not, for what they may be 

 worth. 1 cannot say that I think there would be any very high degree 

 of value in a rule of that sort; and I think I should be quite unable 

 to comply with it myself. I have a habit myself, whenever I feel 

 strongly upon any question and have decided convictions in respect to 

 it, to express myself accordingly. I have no other way of arguing it; 

 and I do not object to the Tribunal's believing, when I speak as if I 

 believed in the opinions expressed by me, that 1 really do believe them, 

 and this, too, notwithstanding any derogatory estimate which an opinion 

 of that sort might compel them to form concerning the soundness of 

 my views as a lawyer. 



I say this in reference to our printed argument, so far as I have had 

 anything to do with it, and I say it in reference to anything that I have 

 expressed, or shall hereafter express, in oral argument. I might add 

 to this that I do not think the learned counsel himself very well follows 

 the rule which he has suggested. He has a habit sometimes of s]>eak- 

 ing as if he really believed what he said, and as if he expected others 

 to think he so believed. And I cannot help thinking that he has at 

 times expressed himself with such force and earnestness as to indicate 

 that he really did mean what he said and intended the Tribunal and 

 ourselves to believe so. It would be very difHcult for me to listen to 

 arguments of counsel except upon a rule of that sort. 



I say this for the purpose of showitig, not that counsel are not at 

 liberty to submit to judicial Tribunals opinions or arguments as to 

 which they may have some possible doubt, with a view of allowing the 

 Tribunal to weigh them; but I say it for the purpose of intimating that 

 I have no objection to having the Court suppose that I really entertain 

 the opinions which I ai^pear to entertain and express myself as enter- 

 taining. 



So much for that. Now let me come to the real subject of this debate. 

 It has taken a very wide range indeed. I do not complain of the extent 

 of that range. A great many things have been said in it perhaps not 

 rigidly vital to the questions arising upon the particular motion which 

 has been submitted to the Tribunal; but still they have a bearing upon 

 it, and they are also things which at some time or other, in the course 

 of the discussions which will take place before the Tribunal, would be 

 likely to be said, nay, which would have to be said; and we may say in 

 regard to them, or some of them, at least, that they may as well be said 

 at the start, and the necessity of repeating them hereafter may thereby 

 be dispensed with, x)ossib]y. 



But what is the nature of the proceeding which is now before the 

 Tribunal? Wliat are we talking to? What was it that occasioned this 

 present discussion? We can at least ascertain the point where we 



