ARGUMENTS ON PRELIMINARY MOTIONS. 99 



SO far as possible. It could not be remedied filtojietber. The counsel 

 for Great Britaiu were already iu possession of our Case and that knowl- 

 edge could not be recalled. Just look at it for a moment if you please. 

 I ought to call the attention of the learned Arbitrators to the special 

 advantages which Great Britain thus gained. In the first place they 

 knew what our grounds were before committing themselves. We had 

 comniittod ourselves fully and completely, not only iu respect to allega- 

 tion, but in respect to evidence. They had not committed themselves 

 at all. In the next place they had gained the advantage of selecting 

 their witnesses. There was a great number of witnesses who had, iu 

 one form or another, officially or otherwise, spoken in relation to the 

 nature and habits of seals and to the course of procedure upon the 

 Pribylof Islands. Official Reports in some instances contained some- 

 thing which might be understood to be for the benefit of Great Britain, 

 and something for the benefit of the United States. There was a great 

 deal of a documentary character out of which one party might pick 

 something which it supposed to be to its advantage and the other x)arty 

 might also select something which would be to its advantage. 



Well now, if a party was obliged to decide in the first instance whether 

 he would make such a person his witness or not, he would be obliged to 

 say to himself, " I must use this man as my witness, because I do not 

 know that my adversary will use him as his, and therefore I must 

 decide now, and make him my witness now." What advantage did the 

 counsel for Great Britain gain in that particular. Why, they were able 

 to look into the Case of the United States, and see the various reports 

 which had been made parts of the evidence in that Case, and if there 

 were anything tending to favour the interests of Great Britain, they 

 could get the benefit of it without making the persons who made the 

 reports their witnesses — could treat their own witnesses as being the 

 witnesses of the other party, and gain all the advantages derivable from 

 that treatment — very decisive sometimes, as the learned Arbitrators 

 will easily understand, in judicial controversies. That advantage they 

 gained. 



Another advantage they gained. There were quite a number of points 

 which would presumably be the subjects of dispute, as to which the depo- 

 sitions of witnesses, pelagic sealers, inhabitants of the coasts of the Beh- 

 ring sea and its vicinity would be called. How many witnesses was it 

 necessary to call to establish any particular position? The United 

 States in framing their Case were obliged to determine that question 

 with no lights other than conjecture, and say. "We will call so many 

 witnesses, and we will not go any further. We think that is sufficient 

 to establish the fact, unless it is overcome by tbe number of witnesses 

 adduced u])on the other side. That is a matter as to which we cannot 

 determine beforehand. We can only form a conjecture in reference to 

 it." The United States made up its Case under those disadvantages. 

 But the counsel for Great Britain waited until they came to prepare 

 their Counter Case and could then say, " to this lumit the United States 

 has introduced so many witnesses: we will introduce a dozen more. 

 As to this other point the United States has introduced so many wit- 

 nesses: we will introduce a dozen more;" and so on through all the 

 disputed questions. That is another very important advantage which 

 they gained. 



But finally and decisively they gained this overwhelming advantage, 

 that they w^ere able to meet the testimony of the United States in all 

 the ways in which adverse testimony may be met — by contradiction, by 

 qualification, by overcoming it by the production of other and adverse 



