110 ARGUMENTS ON PRELIMINARY MOTIONS. 



in the Rey)ort of the British Commissioners should be received. Well, 

 we felt injured when we found that a contrary course had been adopted. 

 My learned friend has spoken about an eaoerness on our part to shew 

 a g-rievance. 1 admit we felt one. We felt one at each of these steps 

 wliich I have been describing. We could not feel otherwise; and I 

 submit it to the candor of every Gentleman upon this Tribunal 

 whether we were not justified in having* that sentiment of grievance. 

 We did feel it. But what were we to do? There was only one course 

 left to us, and that was the one which we indicated in the correspond- 

 ence we would take. And that was, that when the Tribunal met we 

 might move to strike out all matter which ought to have been inserted 

 in the original Case. We have not done that. Why have we not done 

 that? Well, there are several reasons for that. We could make an 

 overwhelming case calling upon this Tribunal to reject that matter. 

 But what would be the consequence of that? One of two things. 

 Great Britain might withdraw from this Arbitration if she could. It 

 is a question if she could not even then. But, if she could not do that, 

 an appeal would of course be made to the Tribunal to allow the evi- 

 dence which had been thus irregularly introduced to be in form pre- 

 sented. That w^ould involve a delay, — a postponement, — a very long 

 postponement for the purpose of enabling them to put themselves recti in 

 curia. Well, we cannot afford to delay. These poor seals are suffering, 

 or will suffer, when the wo^Z«S'yM'e«ditermiiuites, and we are very desir- 

 ous to obtain a decision of this Tribunal before the race shall be left 

 again to the mercy of pelagic sealing sealers? If the Tribunal should 

 strike out the matter and tlieu require the Arbitration to proceed, the 

 representatives of Great Britain could not complain of such a decision. 

 The difSeulfy would be one they had brought upon themselves, and 

 without fault upon our part, and the consequences might be justly left 

 to fall upon them. But we know the indisposition of a Judicial Tribunal 

 desirous of administering justice in a controversy, to go to the final 

 determination of it when they feel it to be true, from whatever cause, 

 that all the materials to which they could properly look to ascertain the 

 truth are not before them. 



No Tribunal intent upon the business of administering substantial 

 justice ever enters upon a task of that sort except reluctantly, and I feel 

 bound to say also that, so far as I am concerned, nothing is more dis- 

 agreeable to me — I think it is so with every lawyer — to go into conten- 

 tion with a crippled adversary, no matter on what ground that adver- 

 sary has been crippled. And, thinking that, after all, the truth in 

 reference to the nature and habits of the fur-seals was established on 

 the whole by such a weight of testimony that it could not be seriously 

 affected, and that the most important interests would not be imperilled, 

 we concluded to waive our objections to this testimony thus wrongfully 

 introduced, and to let it stand in the Counter Case for what it was worth, 

 subject however to that sort of comment which we are entitled to make 

 in reference to it whenever upon the main arijiument the question arises 

 as to the confidence and weight to which it 15 entitled. 



There was one particular, however, in which we felt bound to make 

 a motion, and we did make it, and that was to dismiss from the atten- 

 tion of the Tribunal so much of the matter contained in the Counter 

 Case of Her Majesty's Government as related to new claims for dam- 

 ages as to which no mention was made in the original Case. That 

 motion was made, and was brought on by us at the same time with the 

 one which I am now arguing; but, at the suggestion and under the 

 direction of the President, the hearing of it was deferred. 



