ARGUMENTS ON PRELIMINARY MOTIONS. 117 



make it necessary to consider the question of concurrent Regulations. 

 Tliey put that interpretation upon the word "contingency". That, 

 alioW me to say is not unnatural, nor will I say it is unreasonable. We 

 naturally look for the explanation of any word in any agreement to 

 some other part of the agreement, and when there is a contingency 

 expressed in the seventh Article, they infer that that is the contingency 

 mentioned. But is it so? Well now, we must not take it that it is so, 

 and thus draw upon ourselves all the consequences, the inadmissible and 

 unjust consequences, which I have already mentioned, unless there is 

 no other explanation of that word "contingency". If there is any 

 other explanation of that word " contingency", which is consistent with 

 the main purjwse and object of the Treaty — consistent with its prime 

 condition, that the parties shall have an opportunity to answer the evi- 

 dence and allegations of each other, — we must adopt such other inter- 

 pretation. What I shall now have the honor to submit to you is that 

 there is another contingency, and a contingency which is referred to by 

 this ninth Article, and that the contingency mentioned in the seventh 

 Article is the one intended. To make my meaning clear on this point 

 it is necessary for me to make a brief recital. In the negotiations and 

 correspondence between the parties, diplomatically, which led to the 

 adoption of this Treaty of Arbitration, there were at all times two main 

 objects in view. The whole scheme of a settlement of this controversy 

 wore from the beginning, and preserved until the last, two aspects quite 

 distinct. The first aspect was that an effort should be made to settle 

 the entire controversy by convention, and without Arbitration; the sec- 

 ond aspect was that, in case of the failure of that eff'ort, Arbitration 

 should be resorted to. 



To make that clear, I must have recourse to the first occasion, in the 

 course of the diplomatic correspondence, in which this settlement by 

 Arbitration was referred to; and I call attention to the note of Sir 

 Julian Pauncefote to Mr. Blaine, of April 29tli, 1890, which is contained 

 in the Appendix, volume III of the British Case, at page 455. " Wash- 

 ington, April 29th, 1890. Dear Mr. Blaine. At the last sitting of the 

 Conference on the Behring Sea Fisheries question, you expressed doubts, 

 after reading the memorandum of the Canadian Minister of Marine and 

 Fisheries, which, by your courtesy, has since been printed, whether 

 any arrangement could be arrived at that would be satisfactory to 

 Canada." I should state here that the negotiations had been proceed- 

 ing between the parties at that time for a very considerable period, and 

 efforts for adjustment had been made. The obstacle was the objection 

 of Canada. Pro]iosals had been made by the United States for a set- 

 tlement, and had been, provisionally at least, acceded to by Lord Salis- 

 bury. The conclusion of them had been interru])ted by the objections of 

 Canada, and Mr. Blaine here expressed the doubt whether these objec- 

 tions of Canada coukl ever be removed. Well, in order to answer that 

 objection, Sir Julian Pauncefote j)roposes, and proposes for the first 

 time, a scheme of settling the (controversy whicli, presumably, as it 

 came from him in answer to that suggestion on the part of Mr. Blaine, 

 would be satisfactory to Canada. 



He continues: — "You observed that the proposal of the United 

 States had now been two years before Her JMajesty's Government, that 

 there was nothing further to urge in support of it, and you invited me 

 to make a counter-i)roposal on your behalf". He says " your", but one 

 would supi)ose it should be "my". "To that task I have most ear- 

 nestly a|)])lied myself, and while fully sensible of its great difticulty, 

 owing to the conflict of opinion and of testimony which has manifested 



