132 ARGUMENTS ON PRELIMINARY MOTIONS. 



fore conld not have been introdnced into it. Next, we suppose that 

 nmcli of the matter contained is germane and i)roper to be inserted in 

 the Counter Case by way of reply to what was contained in the Eeport 

 of the Commissioners of Great Britain, which was, by agreement, made 

 part of the original Case of Great Britain, and therefore perfectly regu- 

 lar in that point of view. So far as there may be anything beyond 

 that, if there is any objection to it, if it is supj)osed by the other side 

 that this is matter which ought to have been inserted in the original 

 Case, and which, had it been inserted in the original Case they should 

 have had an opportunity to reply to — we do not ask to have it retained; 

 and ui)on their objection, if they can jioint to any matter distinctly of 

 that description we are willing to have it stricken out, provided, of 

 course, the same rule is applied to them in respect to any new matter 

 submitted by them in their Counter Case. 



Mr. Foster. — The matters relate to the conditions of seal life in 1892. 



Mr. Carter. — Of course, that is what I have said, that it had refer- 

 ence to facts occurring while the Case was under prejDaratiou, that is 

 seal life in 1892. 



The President. — You practically make no motion for retiring part 

 of the evidence brought forward in the British Counter Case. 



Mr. Carter. — We do not make any such motion. Yesterday I 

 endeavored to explain to the learned arbitrators the grounds upon which 

 we thought it inexpedient to do so. We could make that motion, and as 

 we conceive, it should be granted and would be granted. But where 

 sliould we be left? Why, the practical failure of the arbitration almost 

 might be involved, or we be called upon to go into a contest here with 

 our adversaries crippled. That is not the kind of controversy in which 

 lawyers like to engage, even where the crippling comes in consequence 

 of tlieir own fault and not in consequence of any fault of ours. It is not 

 a victory won over an adversary who is in that condition that we desire. 

 It is a settlement of this controversy upon just grounds. It is a settle- 

 ment of the controversy when the Tribunal has before it all the facts 

 proper to be looked into for the purposes of a settlement. That is what 

 we desire; what we regret is, that those facts were not placed before 

 the Tribunal at the time and in the manner in which it was contem- 

 plated by the provisions of the Treaty they should have been placed. 

 That is our grievance — as my learned friend has observed that we seem 

 to be in search of a grievance. I confess it is a grievance. Must a 

 party when he it stricken with a pretty severe blow rest quiet under it 

 and say nothing about it, or else be stigmatized as searching for a 

 grievance'? We maybe subject to that observation, that criticism; but 

 it is in our judgment a circumstance far too important to be omitted 

 from deliberate consideration in the course of the discussions in this 

 case. 



There is one other matter which has been referred to and assump- 

 tions made in reference to it several times during the course of the 

 argument, and which, although it is not in any sense material to the 

 present discussion, I ought perhaps to say a single word in regard to. 



Calling the attention of the arbitrators again to the provisions of 

 article 6, it appears that there are four questions which purport upon 

 their face to relate in some manner to an asserted power or jurisdiction 

 of the United States in Behring Sea. There are four of them of that 

 character. The fifth is: 



Has the United States any right, and if so what right, of protection or property 

 in the fur-seals frequenting the islands of the United States in Behring sea when 

 such seals are found outside the ordinary three mile limit. 



