79 



gence from any power. Having once been iniblicly questioned it must 

 be publicly acknowledged. * * * 



"It will, of course, strike the Eussian plenipotentiaries that by the 

 adoption of the American article respecting navigation, etc., the pro- 

 A'ision for an exclusive fishery of two leagues from the coasts of our 

 respective possessions falls to the ground. But the omission is, in 

 truth, immaterial. The law of nations assigns the exclusive sovereignty 

 of one league to each power on its own coasts, without any specific stijju- 

 lation, and though Sir Charles Bagot was authorized to sign the con- 

 vention with the specific stipulation of two leagues, in ignorance of what 

 had been decided in the American convention at the time, yet, after 

 that convention has been some months before the world, and after the 

 opportunity of consideration has been forced upon us by the act of 

 Russia herself, we can not now consent in negotiating de novo to a stipu- 

 lation which, while it is absolutely unimportant to any practical good, 

 would appear to establish a contrast between the United States and us 

 to our disadvantage. Count ISTesselrode himself has frankly admitted 

 that it was natural that we should exi)ect, and reasonable that we 

 should receive, at the hands of Russia, equal measure in all resi^ects, 

 witli the United States of America. 



"It remains only, in recai^itulation, to remind you of the origin and 

 l>riuciples of the whole negotiation. It is not on our part essentially a 

 negotiation about limits. It is the demaiul of the rej^eal of an offensive 

 and unjustifiable arrogation of exclusive jurisdiction over an ocean of 

 unmeasured extent, but a demand qualified and mitigated in its manner 

 in order that its justice may be acknowledged and satisfied without 

 soreness or humiliation on the jiart of Russia. We negotiate about 

 territory to cover the remonstrauce n^on principle. But any attempt 

 to take undue advantage of this voluntary facility we must oppose. 

 If the present ^projeV is agreeable to Russia, we are ready to conclude 

 and vsign the treaty. If the territorial arrangements are not satis- 

 factory, we are ready to postpone them; and to conclude and sign the 

 essential part, that which relates to navigation alone, adding an article, 

 stipulating to negotiate about territorial limits hereafter. But we are 

 not prepared to defer any longer the settlement of that essential part 

 of the question, and if Russia will neither sign the whole convention 

 nor that essential part of it, she must not take it amiss that we resort 

 to some mode of recording in the face of the world our protest against 

 the pretensions of the Ukase of 1821, and of effectually securing our 



