ill tlie open waters of the ocean, the highway of all peoples, is to be de- 

 termined ultimately by the public law of nations — that is, by those prin- 

 ciples common to, and recognized as binding by, all civilized countries 

 in their intercourse and relations with eacli other. No other law can be 

 appealed to for the settlement of a dispute between sovereign nations 

 as to the ownership of animals when found on the seas beyond their 

 resi)ective territorial limits. But by what considerations are we to be 

 governed in ascertaining what the law of nations recognizes, allows, or 

 forbids? 



The counsel for the United States contended, in argument, that in 

 determining what rights are recognized by the law of nations, the Tri- 

 bunal is not to ignore, but must give effect to, tliose principles of riglit 

 reason, justice, humanity, and morality which have their foundation in 

 the law of nature as applied to the institution of property. This view 

 was earnestly combated by the counsel of Great Britain, and it was, 

 in effect, said that the teachings and precepts of the law of nature 

 were of no importance in the present inquiry; that the riglits of these 

 two nations could not be made to depend, in any degree, upon abstract 

 prin('ii>]es founded only on reason, justice, humanity, or morality, but 

 must be determined upon grounds of positive law, resting in the aflirm- 

 ative assent of the nations, independently of ethical considerations aris- 

 ing out of distinctions which the conscience of the world makes between 

 what is morally right and wliat is morally wrong, or between wlnit is 

 supported by sound reason and justice and what is not so supported. 



Of course, if there be any settled, recognized rules of the law of nations 

 governing tlie particular question under consideration, they must con- 

 trol our decision whatev^er may be our view of their justice. The two 

 nations interested are bound by such rules and the Tribunal may not 

 disregard them, or refuse to give effect to them. But if the precise 

 case before it is not covered by some positive rule, decision or prece- 

 dent, fonnded on the conventions or established usages of the civilized 

 nations of the earth, and expressly set forth in the writings of public 

 urists, we are not, for that reason, to liold that it is not pro- 

 vided for by the law of nations. As a court sitting under mnnicipal 

 authority would be bound, in the absence of precedent, to give judg- 

 ment according to the principles of right derived from the whole 

 body of the law to which it may properly refer, so this Tribunal, 

 constituted for the determination of questions depending upon the law 

 of nations, may, and if it fulfills the objects for which it was constituted, 

 nmst, look into the recognized sources of that law and seek in the 



