134 



(loiiiniii of o-cneral jnrispnidciice for the rule of decision in the ease 

 before it. One of the recognized sonrces of the law of nations are tlie 

 principles of natnral reason and justice applicable to the relations 

 and intercourse of independent political societies. Those princi- 

 ples may be said to have their origin in the Law of Nature, or in 

 what is sometimes called the Natural Law of Eqnity, because ap- 

 proved by the moral sense of mankind. No earthly tribunal, adminis- 

 tering Justice between individuals, or b(^tween nations, if unfettered by 

 statute, or by binding precedent, may rightfully disregard the rules of 

 reason, morality, humanity, and justice derived from that law. Those 

 rules are not the less binding because not formulated in some book, 

 ordinance, or treaty. Certainly, this Tribunal of Arbitration must 

 regard the rules of international morality and justice, applicable to the 

 subject, and fairly to be deduced from the rights and duties of States 

 and from the nature of moral obligations, as nn integral i^art of the 

 law of nations by which the matters submitted to it are to be deter- 

 mined. The institution of property is ordained by society for its 

 improvement and preservation. And there are certain rules, aris- 

 ing out of the very necessities of that institution, which are com- 

 mon to the jurisprudence of all civilized nations. While these rules 

 may be more frequently found recognized in municipal law, they 

 are so grounded in the well-being of man, and so thoroughly sujiported 

 by right reason, and natural justice, as to have become universally rec- 

 ognized, and, therefore, must be regarded as part of the common law of 

 civilized countries. Nations, no more than individuals, may disregard 

 those rules, for upon their observance depends the existence of organized 

 society and the security of government among civilized peoples. 



That I am not in error in supposing that these views have been gen- 

 erally accepted and are enforced where action is not controlled by stat- 

 utes or by the provisions of treaties, will a|ipear from the decisions of 

 courts and from the works of writers upon international law. 



Chief Justice Marshall, delivering thejudgment of the Supreme Court 

 of the United States, after obsei'ving that the law of nations is in 

 part unwritten and in part conventional, said that "to ascertain that 

 which is unwritten we resort to the great principles of reason and . 

 justice; but as these principles will be diflf'erently understood by 

 difterent nations under different circumstances, we consider them as 

 being, in sojue degree, fixed and rendered stable by a series of judicial 

 decisions." Thirty Ilhds. of Sugar vs. Boyle, etc., 9 CrancWs BejJorts, 

 191, 197, 



