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society can not have exempted tliem from the obligation to observe 

 those laws, since by that nnion they do not cease to be men, the entire 

 nation, whose common willis bat the result of the united wills of the 

 citizens, remains subject to the law of nature, and is bound to respect 

 them in all her proceedings." We must, therefore, he says, apply to 

 nations the rules of the law of nature, where they can be applied in a 

 manner suitable to the subject, "in order to discover what their obli- 

 gations are, and what their rights; consequently, the hue of 7iations is 

 originally no other than the law of nature applied to nations." Gli. 50, 

 sees. 5, 6. 



Wheaton, whose authority is recognized by all publicists, says: 

 "International law, as understood among civilized nations, may be 

 defined as consisting of those rules of conduct which reason deduces, as 

 consonant to justice, from the nature of the society existing among 

 independent nations, with such definitions and modifications as may be 

 established by geueral consent." Tnternational Laic, Pi. 1, eli. 1, sec. 

 414. Pomeroy, an American writer of distinction, observes: " VV^hat is 

 called international law in its geueral sense, I would call iuternatioual 

 morality. It consists of those rules founded upon justice and equity, 

 and deduced by right reason, according to which independent states 

 are accustomed to regulate their nuitual intercourse, and to which tliey 

 conform their mutual relations." International Law, ed. 1886, G. 1, S. 

 29. Woolsey, anotlier American writer, cited by both sides in argu- 

 ment, says: "It would be strange if the state, that power which defines 

 rights and makes them real, which creates moral persons or associa- 

 tions with rights and obligations, should have no such relations of its 

 own — should be a physical and not a moral entity. In fact, to lake the 

 opposite gr(mnd would be to maintain that there is no right and wrong 

 in the intercourse of states, and to leave their conduct to the sway of 

 mere convenience." Ed. of 1892. 



r>urlamaqui, in his Priucii)les of Natural and Politic Law, (p. 14), 

 after quoting witli a]>proval the observation of Ilobbes that natural 

 law is divided into the natural law of man and the natural law of 

 states, and that the latter is wiiat is called tlie law of nations, ]>resents 

 the same general view: "Thus natural law and the law of nations 

 are in reality one and the same thing, and ditfer only by an external 

 denomination. We must, therefore, say that the law of nations, prop- 

 erly so called, and considered as a law proceeding from a superior, is 

 nothing else but the law of nature itself, not applied to men, considered 

 simply as such, but to nations, states, or their chiefs, in the relations 

 they have together, and the several interests they have to manage 



