142 



of society, evidenced by the coucurriug municipal law of the world^ 

 demand at its hands. 



Any other view is, I submit, inadmissible. The law of self-defense 

 is a part of the law of nations, not so much because it is declared 

 to be so by legislation or treaty, but because it is founded in prin- 

 ciples of justice and right that are recognized among all peoples. 

 Murder and theft are crimes against society, Avhether so declared by 

 statute or not, and they would be so regarded by any Tribunal ad- 

 ministering the law of nations, if its judgment depended ui)on its 

 estimate of those acts, not because they are made crimes by any 

 statute or convention binding upon the world, but because all nuiu- 

 kind, in recognition of the principles of eternal and natural justice, 

 implanted in man by the Creator, regard them in that light. It is said 

 that even if there be grounds of reason and justice, that is of natural 

 law, why it might be i)roj)er and desirable that these far seals should 

 be held to be the subject of property, such considerations are of no 

 weight whatever in the absence of the general assent of luxtions that 

 they may be so regarded. Such an argument leads to this strange 

 conclusion: That in the absence of any affirmative assent of nations 

 to a right decision, that is, to a decision conformable to the principles 

 of sound reason, justice, and the necessities of mankind, we must, 

 for the want of such assent, make a wrong decision, that is, one 

 forbidden by sound reason and justice and hostile to tlie best inter- 

 ests of society. Thus, according to the argnment presented, a Tribunal 

 administering international law must, in the absence of the express 

 assent of the nations, reject every new affirmative proposition, however 

 strongly supported by reason, justice, and morality, and thereby 

 establish the contrary as the rule that should govern the condnet of 

 nations. Tiue wisdom, indeed, the Treaty and public law, I sub- 

 mit, require that this Tribunal accept the doctrine that whatever is 

 demanded by right reason, justice, and morality has the sanction of 

 the law of nations, unless it has been otherwise determined by the gen- 

 eral assent of mankind. This was the principle declared by Mr. Justice 

 iStory, when he said: "I think it may be unequivocally affirmed that 

 every doctrine that may be fairly deduced by correct reasoning from 

 the rights and duties of nations and the nature of moral obligations, 

 may theoretically be said to exist in the law of nations; and unless it 

 be relaxed or waived by tlie consent of nations, which may be evidenced 

 by their general practice and custom, it may be enforced by a court 

 of justice wherever it arises in judgment/ La Jcunc Eayciuc^ 2 Mason's 

 Bc^ortSj 449, 



