158 



Let us see what are tlie analogies between tlie case of these fur seals 

 and the case of certain animals, y'erflc naturw, which, according to uni- 

 versal law, may become the subject of individual j^roperty. This mode 

 of reasoning, although pronounced in argument to be unsafe and likely 

 to mislead, has the sanction of experience. A very large prox)ortion 

 of the judicial decisions in both the United States and Great Britain 

 rest upon the application that has been made in cases, new in their 

 circumstances, of the ijrinciple of rules announced in prior cases. Parke, 

 J. in Mirehouse vs. Eenncll,SBingJM7)i,\). 51o, declared it to be of import- 

 ance to keep this principle of decision steadily in view, not merely for the 

 determination of the particular case, but for the interests of the law as 

 a science. And Dr. Phillimore has well said that analogy has great 

 influence on the decisions of international as well as of municipal 

 tribunals. 1 Phillimore, § 39. Another writer declares analogy to be 

 the instrument of the progress and development of the law. Bowtjers 

 Headings, p. 88. If the conditions, which courts aud jurists have held 

 to be suCticient to give a right of property in certain useful animals 

 ferce natiirw, substantially exist in the cases of other wild aninmls, 

 valuable to mankind, and in respect to which no ruling has been made, 

 then the principle of the j)rior cases, so far as applicable, may well be 

 recognized and enforced in subsequent cases. 



In what way, according to the authorities, may property be acquired 

 in a swarm of bees'? All that need be done by man, as a condition of 

 acquiring i)roperty in them, is to provide, on his premises, a place or 

 hive where they may abide, to which they may come and go at will, 

 and at which a proper proportion of their honey can be obtained from 

 time to time. While in some countries bees are fed, as a general rule 

 they gather, here and there, without man's aid, all that is necessary to 

 nourish them. The owner never puts his hand upon the swarm, or 

 upon individual bees, though he might shut them up, from time to time, 

 in their hive. It has never occurred to any writer or court to consider 

 whether ownership of the swarm depended upon the ability of theownerto 

 identify, and prove ownership of, each individual bee. The question 

 of proi)erty does not arise as to individual bees, but only in respect to 

 the swarm. All that the owner need do is to i^rovide a jilace for the 

 swarm, abstain from taking all the honey made by the bees, but leaving 

 enough to sustain them until the next year, and protect them against 

 disturbance while in the hive. That being done, as long as they occupy 

 that hive for their abiding place, when not moving through the air, and 



