165 



passed beyond territorial waters. Notwitlistaiiding they frequent the 

 sea for purposes of food, they are strictly land, rather than marine, 

 animals, because they are conceived and are born and reared on land, 

 could not be conceived nor come into existence in the waters of tlie 

 ocean, and must, from the necessities of their natnre, abide upon laiul 

 at stated periods. 



Next, it is said that some of the seals which have been on the islands 

 of St. Paul are known to have gone the succeeding year to the island 

 of St. George. The proof on that point is too slight and unsatisfactory 

 to be regarded. But if the fact be as suggested, it would bo wholly 

 immaterial in the present inquiry; for both islands, taken together, are 

 the property of one nation, and that nation only is in a position to deal 

 with the race as a whole and save it from extermination. 



I have not understood learned counsel to dispute the proposition 

 that, according to the jurisprudence of all civilized nations, some 

 animals ferce naturae are susceptible of ownership. Nor do they 

 insist that the principles recognized in the Eoman law, and equally 

 iu England and the United States, in respect to the acquisition of 

 property in bees, pigeons, deer, etc., do not obtain in all civilized coun- 

 tries. We have not been referred to any instance in which it has been 

 otherwise declared. But it is earnestly contended that the differences 

 between fur seals on one side and bees, pigeons, deer, and the like, 

 on the other side, are such as to i)rechide the application to the former 

 of the rules determining the acquisition .of proi)erty in the latter 

 class of animals. That all these animals are unlike in many respects 

 no one will dispute. But this circumstance is not of legal conse- 

 quence, unless the differences are such as to prevent the application 

 of the general rule prescribing the conditions on which property may 

 be acquired iu wild animals. There are no two classes of domestic 

 animals exactly alike in their nature and habits, but there are qualities 

 common to all such animals which justify the law not only in declar- 

 ing them to be the subject of ownership by man, but in declaring 

 that the right of property in them is not lost while they are absent 

 from the owner, even without the intention of returning to his ])osess- 

 siou. Now, upon what ground rests the general rule that animals 

 fcrm natarcjc may not become the subject of property? And why does 

 the law recognize exceptioiis to that rule in the case of some animals 

 which admittedly belong, in their original coudition, to that class*? 



