18^ 



employmcTit of liis ground to that use is profitable to the plaintiff, as is 

 the skill and management of that employment. As to the first, every 

 man that hath a property may enjoy it for his pleasure and profit, as 

 for alluring and procuring ducks to come to his jioiul. To learn the 

 trade of seducing other ducks to come there in order to be taken is 

 not prohibited either by the law of the land or the moral law; bat it 

 is as lawful to use art to seduce them, to catch them, and destroy them 

 for the use of mankind as to kill and destroy Mild fowl or tame cattle. 

 Then, when a man useth his art or his skill to take them to sell and 

 dispose of for his profit, this is his trade; and he that hinders another 



in his trade or livelihood is liable for an action for so hindering him. 



******* 



" And when we do know that of long time in the Kingdom these arti- 

 ficial contrivances of decoy ponds and decoy ducks have been used for 

 enticing into these ponds wild fowl in order to be takeu for the profit of 

 the owner of the pond, who is at the expense of servants, engines, and 

 other management, whereby the markets of the nation may be fur- 

 nished, there is great reason to give encouragement thereunto, that 

 the peoi)le who are so instrumental by their skill and industry so to 

 furnish the markets should reap the benefits and have their action. 

 But, in short, that which is the true reason is that this action is not 

 brought to recover damage for the loss of the fowl, but for the dis- 

 turbance." In the report of the same case in {11 Modern, 75), the Chief 

 Justice says: "Suppose the defendant had shot in his own ground; 

 if he had occasion to shoot it would be one thing, but to shoot on pur- 

 pose to damage the plaintiff is another thing and a wrong." 



The two cases last cited are alike in that in each the plaintiff sought 

 to recover damages for a malicious injury to an alleged industry. In 

 Hannam vs. Moclcett, the alleged industry was based upon what the 

 plaintiff had done to secure the coming of the rooks to his lands. But 

 as these animals were fercc naturw and were held not to be useful, the 

 X^laintiff'had no property in them which could be the basis of an indus- 

 try that the law would protect against such acts as those complained 

 of. In Keehle vs. HicJceringill, although the action was not brought to 

 recover damages for the loss of the ducks frightened away from the 

 plaintiff's land by the defendant, its foundation was. necessarily, that 

 the ducks, althongh ferce naturce, were useful, and could be the basis of 

 an industry which the law could protect against the wrongful acts of 

 others to the injury of the person who owned the place to which, by 

 his care, they habitually resorted. 



