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right tlian that of the United States in individnal seals, yet, if their seals 

 are gone estray and are found in the Ahiskan lieids, the United States, 

 if tlieyown those herds, or have the power to protect tlieni, may also 

 lawfully and justly protect the estrays against everybody except the 

 owner. 



Two questions of right are presented in point o of Article VT, viz: 

 The right of property in the fur seals and the right to [>rotect them. 

 These rights are not identical under all circumstances. 



The right to protect property may exist in one who neither has nor 

 claims to have any absolute ownership of the property, and this right 

 has a peculiar force and value on the high seas, where the exposure of 

 property to destruction is great and tlie persons are few who may be 

 able to protect and preserve it. The right to protect property is an 

 element of its ownership, but that right does not always depend on 

 ownership. In this treaty care is taken to submit to the Arbitrators 

 the separate rights of property and of protection as to the seals in or 

 resorting to Behring Sea. 



It musu be admitted tinit these questions in all their beaiings are 

 entirely new. It is their novelty tliat has led to this Arbitration, If 

 thej^ had been capable of solution under the rules and pi'ecedents of 

 international law it must be assumed that two great Governments, 

 equally desirous to protect and i^reserve the fur-seals, would bave 

 readily agreed as to wbich of them was charged with or entitled to per- 

 form that duty. In the absence of such rules and precedents of inter- 

 national law it was wise and just to submit these questions, as new 

 ones, to arbitration. 



The tact that both Governments are required by the treaty "to 

 cooperate in securing the adhesion of other Powers to such Reguhitions" 

 as shall be established by the tribunal, is an indication tliat is really 

 conclusive of the fact that they both expected that the award might be 

 based on new principles or on newly stated exceptions to old rules. 

 If the award could not properly be based on well-settled ])rinciples of 

 international law, the reason for securing the adhesion of other powers 

 would be obvious, whereas that would be ah unnecessary act if the 

 award could be based only upon the concrete principles of internatiomil 

 law, for other nations must be understood as knowing and abiding by 

 the international law. Why should they be asked to give their adhesion 

 to an award that would hold the United States and Great Britain oidy 

 to a faithful observance of international law? 



