Instinct and Discernment 



logical characteristic of them all. It is not 

 free nor conscious in its practice, any more 

 than is the faculty of the stomach for di- 

 gestion or that of the heart for pulsation. 

 The phases of its operations are prede- 

 termined, necessarily entailed one by an- 

 other; they suggest a system of clockwork 

 wherein one wheel set in motion brings 

 about the movement of the next. This is 

 the mechanical side of the insect, the fatitvi, 

 the only thing that is able to explain the 

 monstrous illogicality of a Pelopaeus misled 

 by my artifices. Is the Lamb when it first 

 grips the teat a free and conscious agent, 

 capable of improvement in its difficult art 

 of taking nourishment? The insect is no 

 more capable of improvement in its art, 

 more difficult still, of giving nourishment. 

 But, with its hide-bound science ignorant 

 of itself, pure instinct, if it stood alone, 

 would leave the insect unarmed in the per- 

 petual conflict of circumstances. No two 

 moments in time are identical; though the 

 background remain the same, the details 

 change; the unexpected rises on every side. 

 In this bewildering confusion, a guide is 

 needed to seek, accept, refuse and select; to 

 show preference for this and indifference to 

 that; to turn to account, in short, anything 

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