FICHTE. 27 



proposition absolutely implies the contents A=A, the second proposi- 

 tion is, like the first, absolute, and it is in its contents as in its form. 



It may be said that I am is only a fact of the empirical conscious- 

 ness, but as A=A is an absolute truth, / ohj, or me=me (the proposi- 

 tion upon which X is founded, which X is the necessary identity of 

 A^A) is likewise a proposition absolutely certain. 



Thus then / am ; the me posits the me ; the me posits itself. Ev- 

 ery judgment, we know, is an act of the human mind. The judgment 

 I am is the primitive act, the pure act; to posit oneself constitutes the 

 pure activity; and as / is in the me and by the me just as well as am, 

 as in me=me, the first me, posited in general in and by the me, implies 

 the me just as much as the second me whicli is posited absolutely in 

 and by the me ; it foUovvs that we can equally say, that the me is be- 

 cause it posits itself, or, it posits itself because it is. The me then ex- 

 ists absolutely and necessarily by the me. Before it was conscious of 

 itself, the me was not at all ; by the me, to posit itself, or to be, are iden- 

 tical expressions. 



By merely changing the expression of that deduction and rendering 

 it a little more scientific, I believe it will be difficult to find in it any- 

 thing more than the Cogilo of Descartes, or that very simple expres- 

 sion ; the idea (sentiment) of existence is inscparal)le from personal ex- 

 istence. Between this reduction and me=:mc, there can be oidy the dif- 

 ference of a physical law of nature and its algebraic expression. 



We cannot here give a full analysis of the other two principles which 

 Fichte added to the first. We may just observe however, that the sec- 

 ond principle consists in this, that the me which posits the me oppo- 

 ses the not-me, that is to say, that the negative identical proposition be- 

 ing as absolutely certain as the affirmative, as it is just as true that what 

 is not A is not A, — A= — A^ as it is true that A=^A, not-mc is equal 

 to not-me; but as in that proposition the me is still necessary, the prim- 

 itive and pure act re-appears in all its eniireness. Notwilhsianding tliis 

 we are presented with this singular contradiction, that the negative of 

 the me is supported by the affirmative of the me. And, in fact, fhat 

 which is not me is not me supposes that me is me. But tliere the me sup- 

 poses the not me and posits it, and it does not suppose it or posit it hy- 

 pothetically but in itself. Thus in denying, it affirms it In its con- 

 tents the proposition virtually denies the me, but affirms it in its form. 

 It is conditional in its contents, absolute it its form. The not-me is not 

 the me, is a proposition in which the me posits itself in the me and op- 

 poses itself in the not-me. How can it be that it establishes itself at 

 the very moment when it annihilates itself, because to posit the not-me 



