2S GERMAN PHILOSOPHY 



seems to be to annihilate the me; but it only annihilates it in so far as 

 it posits the not-me. In one word, the me denies and affirms itself, or 

 posits and opposes itself by its self-limitation. 



As the me is primitively posited only in an absolute manner, there 

 cannot primitively be any contrary posited in it but what is opposed to 

 tlie me. — A= — A, or — A is not ^A, is absolute in its form, and conse- 

 quently it is the same as this proposition, the not-me is not the me. — 

 But as that principle is, in its contents and matter, deduced from the for- 

 mer, it is not in that connexion absolute ; it may be thus expressed : the 

 not-me is opposed to the me ; in other words, the me posits itself and 

 opposes the not-me. 



But here there is a contradiction. The me destroys what it has crea- 

 ted ; it posits itself, and in opposing the not-me, we may say that it de- 

 poses itself. In so far as the not-me is posited, the me is not; but the 

 not-me is posited in the me, for all opposition supposes the identity of 

 the me which posits and which opposes, that is to say, that it cannot 

 take place but in so far as a me is posited in an identical consciousness. 

 How can we conceive of A and — A, being and not-being, reality and 

 negation co-existing together without destroying each other reciprocally? 

 This cannot be but upon the condition that they destroy each other in 

 so far as is necessary to their co-existence, tliat is to say, in so far as 

 they limit each other. To limit a thing is not to destroy it, except in 

 part; tliis supposes the thing to be divisil)le; thus the me, just as the 

 not-me, is posited as divisible. This is the third principle, which may 

 be thus expressed ; the nic and the not-me arc both posited by the me 

 as reci})rocally limiting each other. It is this tliird principle tliat recon- 

 ciles the two former, which without it would reciprocally destroy each 

 other. 



^i'his principle, unconditional in its contents, for it gives an absolute 

 solution which rests upon the reason itself, is derived, so far as its form 

 is concerned, for it is determined by the two preceding principles. 



The general cognition resulting from the three principles may be ex- 

 pressed in the following formula : "In the me I oppose to the divisible 

 me a divisible not-me." No piiilosophy according to Ficlitc, can ascend 

 higher than this formula. 



Upon this we must at present make two observations. The first is, 

 that the design of completing the critical philosophy systematically by 

 a principle, has been executed imperfectly ; for, on the one hand, the 

 laws of pure logic are there pre-supposed and are the guaranty for the 

 whole of that deduction ; and, on the other hand, with the laws of logic 

 we have the use of certain fundamental notions, such as activity, reality, 



