( xxxviii ) 



vvuil< t(i lie wliolly scientific ; ami iioinciiclutiirc, Mie language of classification, 

 should therefore have a diflerent formula lor the two different conceptions, if 

 classification is meant to be i)recise. And the language recording in formulas 

 the results of classification must lie precise, because science has specially 

 invented the formulas to prevent confusion arising. 



However, Ijefore going further, let us consider anotiier side of the question. 

 It might be argued, with some degree of justification, that nomenclature is 

 a practical invention for the convenience of the classifier (and those who make 

 use of classification), and, as we said aljove, must not be turned into an 

 inconvenience. Now, if tlie classifier is compelled to distinguish between 

 geographical 1}' isolated fonus wliich are e(|ual to distinct synoecic animals, and 

 such which are not, and again between geograjthical and non-geographical 

 corporeally distinct animals, an amount of work is thrown on him which he 

 could easily avoid by treating all definable forms in the same way, as being 

 all co-ordinate. Those of our readers who follow classificatory literature* are 

 aware that we are not stating an imaginary case, with the object — as so often 

 happens in science and elsewhere — of demolishing an opinion which nobody 

 entertains. The procedure above advocated is certainly a great simplification 

 of work. But we may be allowed to state in resjMnse that a far greater 

 simplification can be attained by putting all geographical modifications of the 

 same type down as identical, nomenclatorially and classificatorially. If the 

 splitter who indiscriminately calls everything definable a " species " claims 

 the right to live, ourselves as impartial onlookers must concede the same right 

 to the lumper who treats everything not conspicuously different as being 

 identical. These two opponents are almost hopelessly at loggerheads. We say 

 almost ; for we perceive some glimmer of hope of a good ending in the fact 

 that, as in the struggle between two nations the victor becomes generally 

 influenced by those details of civilisation in which the vanquished excels, both 

 the lumper and splitter will profit from one another in the course of time, 

 both remaining victorious in the struggle till the end, the one knocking over 

 ■what the other considers distinct, and the other separating again what the 

 former has put together as the same. Do not let it be truly ad infinitum. We 

 sympathise with both ; for we believe that we understand the cause of the 

 struggle and the reason for its unreasonable continuance. When Linne invented 

 his nomenclature (binominal, except most Lepidoptera) for his classification, he 

 started with the conception that the animated world was composed of a great 

 number of forms which, though variable to a certain — mostly small — extent, 

 were fixed entities. These entities he defined as species, and designated each 

 with a name. The introduction of a precise discrimination (or what was meant 

 to be precise) between the species, and their fixation in classification by a name, 

 gave a great impulse to collecting and studying the forms of animated creation. 

 During the last century the material increased at such a rate that the number 

 of species known to Linne became soon insignificant as compared with what 

 * See, for instance, Vtrli. V. Intern. Hool. Conijrcss p. 910 (1902). 



