28 Journal of the Mitchell Society [December 



sjiocies and individuals. Intelligence has no part in the development 

 of the instinct that draws nocturnal Lepidoptera toward the light, 

 nor has it doubtless anything to do with the rhythms through which 

 organic memory manifests itself. But intelligence it is that regulates 

 by appropriate selection all manifestations of race memory; intelli- 

 gence again in the sundry forms of association and individual memory, 

 that puts together the most complicated mechanisms of instinct. 



Instincts are of various kinds. If, by the word instinct we under- 

 stand not any one special faculty but the complex of all the instincts, 

 namely, the innate automatism regardless of its origin, we can say 

 with Bergson that instinct and intelligence "are not things belonging 

 to one and the same order, " that they "diverge in direct ratio of their 

 development," but that "they never become completely separate." 

 They are both "opposites and complements" and they assist one 

 another. "On the one hand, indeed, the most perfect instincts of the. 

 insects are accompanied by certain gleams of intelligence, be it only 

 in the choice of place, time or material of construction. When by ex- 

 ception bees build their nest in the open they invent arrangements 

 which are new and in the true sense intelligent to meet the new con- 

 ditions. On the other hand, intelligence has still more use for instinct 

 than instinct has for intsUigence, since the ability to work up raw 

 material presupposes in the animal a superior grade of organization, to 

 which it could have arisen on the wings of instinct only." Before 

 such evidence as this Fabre was forced to modify his theory of immu- 

 table instinct. "By itself, mere instinct," says he, "would leave the 

 insect disarmed in the perpetual conflict of circumstances. A guide 

 is needed in the midst of this bewildering melee. That the insect has 

 such a guide is evident to a high degree. This is the second domain 

 of its psychic powers. Here it is conscious and susceptible of perfect- 

 ing by experience. As I dare not designate this rudimentary aptitude 

 by the name of intelligence, a title too noble for it, I shall call it dis- 

 cernment." But is discernment in this sense not really a form of in- 

 telligence? 



Such is the measure in which instinct and intelligence are com- 

 bined in animals. If, following Bergson, we admit that consciousness 

 "is proportional to the power of selection at the animal's disposal," 

 it will be quite evident that consciousness must be particularly ob- 

 scured in all purely instinctive acts, but that on the contrary it must 

 accompany all intelligent acts. Bergson, however, regards con- 

 sciousness in a peculiar light, since he considers it as "life projected 



