260 Journal of Ac/riculture, Victoria. [10 May, 1916. 



The statistics, compiled from official sources, are presented in tabular 

 form in the appendices, and they should be of interest to those who, 

 whilb anxious to form their own opinions regarding possible future 

 developments, do not care to wade through piles of official statistics 

 expressed in the metric system. 



First, consider the world harvest for 1915. In 1915 the world reaped 

 its record crop. The magnitude of the harvest in enemy countries is 

 not exactly known, though it is known that the harvest in Germany 

 and Austria in 1915 was a partial failure owing to unfavorable weather 

 conditions prior to harvest. 



Reliable authorities agree that the combined crop of Germany and 

 Austria was not more than 80 per cent, of the normal amount. In 

 addition, there was a serious falling-off in the French wheat crop, the 

 production for 1915 being officially estimated at 243,000,000 bushels as 

 compared with a normal production of 317,000,000 bushels for the pre- 

 vious five years, i.e., a shortage of 74,000,000 bushels. Italy, Japan, 

 and Bulgaria also showed decreases in production compared with the 

 normal. 



On the other hand, in all other countries there was increased produc- 

 tion compared with the average of the five years prior to the war. In 

 all, the wheat reaped was 4,577,000,000 bushels, compared with 

 3,816,000,000 bushels for 1914, and 3,944,000,000 bushels for the five 

 years' average prior to the war. 



The world's previous best record was 1913, when 4,272,000,000 

 bushels were reaped — that is to say, the world's production for 1915 is 

 761,000,000 bushels greater than 1914, 633,000,000 more than the five 

 years' average prior to the war, and 305,000,000 more than the previous 

 record crop. The present statistical position, therefore, saems very 

 favorable for consumers and unfavorable for producers. Indeed, if the 

 whole of this enormous surplus were immediately available and could be 

 thrown on the markets of importing countries, a serious slump in prices 

 would be inevitable. 



.\s a matter of fact, however, the Roumanian and Russian surpluses 

 are locked up in the Black Sea ports and cannot, unless peace is de- 

 clared, affect the markets. Roumania and Russia have between them 

 a surplus of over 300,000,000 bushels. So long as the Dardanelles are 

 closed this surplus cannot affect the market. 



Then, again, the scarcity in freights is producing the same effect as 

 a temporary crop shortage in the importing countries, for operators in 

 America, Argentine, and Australia can only effectively offer, and pur- 

 chasers abroad will only buy, so much of their surplus as they have 

 secured freights for. 



In order to more fully appreciate the present statistical position, con- 

 sider briefly the needs of the importing countries in relation to the 

 surplus available in the exporting countries (these are summarized in 

 Table III. of the appendix). For the five years prior to the war the 

 average import of wheat was approximately 625,000,000 bushels. Of 

 this, Germany and Austria required 80,000,000, the balance being 

 absorbed by the Allies and neutral European Powers. In view of the 

 shortage of production in France for 1915, i.e., 75,000,000, the total 

 requirements of these importing countries (exclusive of Germany and 

 Austria) are 620,000,000 bushels. 



