10 May, 1916.] The Wheat Crop for 1916. 269 



Similarly, to find the probable supply, or surplus available for export 

 in exporting countries, we have to set out (1) the total production of 

 these countries for the year 1915 and (2) deduct the estimated home 

 requirements of the exporting countries. 



In order to avoid fluctuations, it is best to estimate the normal re- 

 quirements of each country on the basis of the five years' average prior 

 to the war. These are summarized in Tables III. and IV. 



In Table III. it will be seen that the importing countries of the 

 world required annually, prior to the war, approximately 625 million 

 bushels of wheat. For the year ending July, 1916, assuming a consump- 

 tion equal to normal times, they would require 744 million bushels. 

 But under war conditions it might be expected that these requirements 

 would be modified. 



Prior to the war the population of the importing countries was 

 steadily increasing, and they were prosperous, consequently the require- 

 ments were increasing year by year. On the other hand, the high price 

 of wheat in the importing countries during the war and the diminished 

 income of the people would tend to economy in the consumption of 

 wheat. The actual requirements for the year 1915, however, were 

 almost equal to the average requirements for the five years prior to the 

 war. Hence we may take the estimated requirements for 1916, in column 

 5, as approximately correct. 



Of the 754 million bushels required for 1916, no less than 193 million 

 bushels are required for Germany, Austria, and Belgium. Assuming the 

 blockade is effective, this amount, less perhaps the quantity required to 

 feed the needy Belgians, may be deducted from the total demand. This 

 would leave from 561 to 614 million bushels as the probable effective 

 demand in allied and neutral importing countries for the year ending 

 July, 1916. 



On the other hand, the exporting countries have available for ship- 

 ment no less than 1,330 million bushels. Of this, the Russian and 

 Roumanian surplus, amounting to 310 million bushels, is securely locked 

 up in the Black Sea. So long as the Dardanelles ai"e closed, this crop 

 cannot be utilized to relieve the importing countries, and may be ignored 

 in determining the present effective supply. Moreover, Bulgaria's 

 surplus of \\\ million bushels must be deducted. This leaves, approxi- 

 mately, 1,010 million bushels surplus available for export in the United 

 States, Canada, Argentina, India, and Australia. That is to say, 

 excluding, on the one hand, the requirements of enemy countries, and, 

 on the other hand, the available supplies of Russia and Rouniania, we 

 have a surplus equivalent to 1,010 million bushels co)npeting for an effec- 

 tive demand of from 561 to 614 nnllion bushels. 



The statistical position is therefore eminently favorable for con- 

 sumers of wheat, and equally unfavorable for wheat producers. In 

 view of the heavy surpluses available for export, one would have expected 

 a serious fall in wheat values since last harvest, esi)ecially in the 

 exporting markets. 



Tal)le VI. gives a suinnuiry of the monthly quotation for wheat in 

 London, Genoa, Winnipeg, Chicago, and Buenos Ayres for the year 

 1915. Tlie prices are taken approximately at tlie middle of the month. 

 ft will be seen that there was a consideiable decline in value in June. 

 1915. when the prospects for a big harvest were assured, but that rrices 

 have been well maintained since. In sj)i(p of scarcity of freigiit and the 

 imn-ense surplus, the level of ]>rices in the ox|>orting countries is con- 

 sideral)ly h'gher than it w;is ;it the outlircak of war. It must be 



