Contemporary Agricultural Law. 145 



The case of Cope v. Shaipe (1912, 1 K.B., 496 ; 81 L.J.K.B., 

 346), the decision of which by the Divisional Coui't was noted 

 at page 196 of Vol. 71, Journal R.A.S.E., has come before the 

 Court of Appeal. The question was whether a tenant of 

 sporting rights, in order to protect those rights when they were 

 threatened by a fire on land adjoining that over which his 

 rights extended, might legally set on fire patches of heather 

 to the leeward of the fire, so that when it spread to those 

 patches it should be checked for want of fuel. The Court of 

 Appeal held that to justify a trespass on the ground that 

 intervention was necessary in order to prevent destruction of 

 property it need not be shown that if the intervention had not 

 taken place the property would have been destroyed or injured. 

 It is sufficient to show that the intervention was, in the 

 circumstances at the time when it took place, in part reason- 

 able. This principle is applicable in the case of any acts done 

 by an occupier or owner of land to protect his land from 

 threatened injury. As the defendant in Cope v. Sharpe, in 

 setting fire to the heather, had done what, at the time when 

 he did it, was reasonably necessary in the circumstances, the 

 court gave judgment in his favour, although in the result his 

 act turned out to be unnecessary, as the fire was in fact 

 extinguished independently of what he did. 



In the case of re Trevor-Battye'' s Settlement ; Bull v. Trevor- 

 Battije (1912, 2 Ch., 339 ; 81 L.J.Ch., 339) the proceeds of sale 

 of l)eech trees cut on an estate in Buckinghamshire, according 

 to the course of management usual in the neighbourhood, were 

 held payable to the tenant for life as " profits " of the estate 

 after paying thereout all costs of replanting and repairing 

 fences, no portion being liable to be invested as capital. 



Kynoch, Lim., v. Roivlands (1912, 1 Ch., 527 ; 81 L.J.Ch., 

 340) was a case in which the ownership of land was in dispute, 

 and the defendant claimed to have acquired a possessory title 

 under the Real Property Limitation Act, 1883. It appeared 

 that his cows, when grazing in his own field, used also to graze 

 on the land in question, between which and his own field there 

 was no boundary fence, but it was held that the mere straying 

 of cattle over a known boundary by reason of there being no 

 fence is not an act of such exclusive possession as will enable 

 the trespasser whose cattle have so strayed on to land of an 

 adjoining owner to acquire a statutory title as against the true 

 owner. 



Aubrey J. Spencer. 



15 01(1 Square, 



Lincoln's Inn, W.C. 



