ti^ QUOTA II?. PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION, II., 



R.S. TAS. 



Let us suppose that A, B, C are the candidates of one 

 section, and D, E, F the candidates of another section, 

 of the same party ; the supporters of the lirst section give 

 a first choice to each of A, B, C, and their subsequent 

 choices to the candidates of the second section (as in the 

 first ballot-paper) ; the supporters of the second section 

 give their first choices to D, E , F , and their subsequent 

 choices to A, B, C (as in the second ballot-paper). 



Let us further suppose that this party has two-thirds 

 of all the voters, and is therefore entitled to four out of 

 the six members; and that on making up the totals of the 

 first choices, A, B, C are found to have each just a quota 

 (either Hare or Droop) ; that all but three of the candi- 

 dates of the other party have been excluded ; and that 

 Z>, E, F each have fewer votes than the three remaining 

 candidates of the other party. There will, then, be just a 

 quota of papers marked like the first ballot-paper ; and 

 the other ballot-papers for the party will be marked like 

 the second ballot-paper. 



A, B, C having just a quota each, there are no votes 

 to be transferred from them, and D, E , F get no benefit 

 from the second, third, and fourth choices given to them 

 on the quota of papers on which A, B, C have first choices. 

 D, E, F being lowest on the poll, one of them has to be 

 excluded ; let it be D. Suppose that the rules provide {~^) 

 that the vot€S of an excluded candidate are to be divided 

 among the candidates having second or next available 

 choices on the papers on which the excluded candidate 

 has a first choice. On /9's papers, the second, third, and 

 fourth choices have been given only to candidates who 

 are already returned. Consequently there is no candi- 

 date available to receive /)'s votes; and all of his votes 

 are lost. One of E, F, say E, is now lowest on the poll; 

 his votes cannot be transferred and are also lost ; finally 

 the votes of the third candidate F are lost. We are left, 

 then, with three elected candidates of the party we have 

 been considering and three candidates of the other party. 

 The other party, numbering only one-third of the voters, 

 and so entitled only to two members, thus gets three. 



The failure to obtain proportional representation has 

 arisen in this case because there were no candidates to 



(^) The rules of the " Launceston Voting System " for pre-electioM 

 contained in The Tajfrna/tif/n Workers' Political League Election Manv%l 

 (Tasmanian ;-Jews Pi-intinji Works, Hol)arr, 1912) have this ju'cvision. 



