BY E. L. PIESSE, B.SC, LL.B. 29" 



1913. 



whom (with the rules supposed) the votes of the excluded 

 candidate could be transferred. With the single transfer- 

 able vote (and no cross-voting or short-voting), an 

 excluded candidate's votes can always be transferred if 

 there is another candidate of the same party unelected, 

 but in the cases just considered, although E, F are still 

 unelected, the rules do not permit of />'s votes going to 

 them. 



69. The following table shows the representation which 

 the Launceston Voting System may give to a party having 

 60 per cent, of the voters in a two-party contest in a six- 

 member district. In the cases in which disproportional 

 representation is shown to be possible, it should be remem- 

 bered that the assumptions necessarv for these cases are 

 not likely to be realised very frequently. 



Multiple Transferable Vote according to the Launceston 

 Voting System in a Six-Member District— Possible 

 Representation of a Party having 60?^^ of the Voters, 

 and so entitled, to Four Members. 



Nuuibn- of First 



Choices allowed Members Returned. 



to each Elector. 



4 The party must get four members. 



If three members are returned each with 

 just a quota, the partv may fail to return 

 a fourth (see §68); totars. 



3 If two members are returned each with 



just a quota, the party may return only 

 one more; total 3. 



If one member is returned with just a quota, 

 the party will get three others; total 4. 



The party must get four members. 



70. Disproportional representation through a division 

 of a party into two sections (as in the cases just considered) 

 can be avoided if the rules provide that on the distribu- 

 tion of a surplus or of the votes of an excluded candidate 

 the votes skall go to the other candidates having first 



