72 OBSERVATIONS ON THE HARE SYSTEM 



By this curious illustration it is shown how, notwithstanding 

 its superior numbers in the aggregate, the major party X has 

 been robbed of a fourth of its representative power by the 

 combined adverse circumstances of artificial inequalities in 

 the size or composition of its electoral divisions, and the 

 unnecessary artificial restriction of voting power within each 

 unnecessary artificial subdivision. By such unfair artificial 

 barriers the major party X — even aided by the wisest organisa- 

 tion — can only return half the number of representatives, 

 whereas, in equity, it should return tmo-thiras ; and, con- 

 versely, the minor party Y by such means returns half the 

 number of representatives, when in all fairness and equity they 

 should, under ideally proper conditions, only return two, or 

 one-third. 



It is the chief merit of the Hare system that it entirely 

 removes all such artificial barriers to just and real representa- 

 tion of the various parties ; for, by its abolition of unwise 

 artificial restrictions it gives full fair play to all the individual 

 forces, and it enables the surplusage of any one division to 

 come to the aid of its own party in any other division, so that 

 no vote would form the element of a lost or wasted surplusage. 

 By the Hare system the inequalities of electoral subdivisions 

 are practically rendered equal and harmless. 



The major party X would in all fairness return four 

 members, and the minor party Y would, in returning two 

 members, be also justly dealt with, as this is the number which 

 in all fairness it has a right to claim or expect. 



The constitution of electoral divisions is thus shown to be 

 the most important feature of the Hare system, and this 

 importance must not be disregarded when acknowledging the 

 full merit of its splendid accessory, the Hare method of 

 preference and transfer vote. 



The Merits of the Preference and Transferable Vote. 



The most valuable accessory, not the primary principle, of 

 Hare's system is the scheme of the Quota-excess and. lowest 

 excluded Candidate Transfer Vote. In the ordinary system 

 of voting it often happens that the fair power of majorities 

 and minorities is wasted by the manner in which the votes are 

 given. The voter has no certain knowledge, and is often 

 obliged to guess his own party's strength. If the voter's one 

 particular choice gets, unnecessarily, too many votes from his 

 own party, and, therefore, useless to him, it may so happen 

 that the second, third, &c. in the order of the voter's preference 



