OF ELECTION IN TASMANIA. 73 



are, from this lack of knowledge, deprived of votes to such an 

 extent that an opposite party's representatives are returned in 

 larger number than their aggregate strength, if fairly measured, 

 would entitle them. Hare's method of preference vote in a 

 very large measure obviates this defect. By indicating his 

 other favourite candidates in order of decreasing preference or 

 increasing order of detestation by 1, 2, 3, &c. no previous 

 knowledge of strength is necessarv. The Hare method is 

 per se a sort of special providence, preventing the waste of 

 valuable votes by automatically distributing surplus strength 

 fairly and exactly to the next and next of preference* until at 

 last the full fair strength of the particular party is properly 

 determined. If combinedly in this way any party fails to 

 return one representative, it is because all the members of the 

 party are too feeble in numbers to have the right to be repre- 

 sented ; if the party on the whole returns one, two, three, or 

 more representatives it is, for the best of all reasons, because 

 this is the exact representation to which, by force of numbers, 

 it is justly and reasonably entitled. 



Thus the method of the Hare preference index, and the 

 transfer in order of preference, effects the part of a never-failing 

 providence, preventing the waste of valuable forces; or, in other 

 words, determining exactly the fair and reasonable repre- 

 sentation of all, in spite of difficulties concerning lack of 

 organisation, or perfect foreknowledge of the strength and the 

 proper allotment or distribution of voting forces. The only 

 persons who may oppose the Hare system aie the selfish 

 aggressor or the selfish indifferent; the former craves to main- 

 tain or gain more than justice; the latter too indifferent or 

 lazy to demand it. 



Popular exaggerated estimates of the influence upon Results 

 of the Distribution of the Quota-excess of the First and 

 Second Order. 



In the Hobart election the distribution of quota-excesses of 

 the first and second order, although differing to a great extent 

 relatively, was, as is the general experience, of little or no 

 absolute importance in altering the effect of the values of first 

 counts and lowest excluded candidates' preference votes in 

 determining the final order of the results of the election. In 

 Launceston, it so happened, there was no quota-excess of the 

 first order, i.e., on the first count, and, consequently, there 



* Tf not preference it equally serves to indicate usefully order of detesta- 

 tion or dislike, No. 1 being least detested, No. 2 next in order of dislike, 

 No. 3, 4, 5 in a similar way next in order of candidates disliked. Even in 

 the order of dislike it must be of service to the elector to see that his most 

 disliked candidates are handicapped by his influence. 



