78 OBSERVATIONS ON THE HARE SYSTEM 



assume that the redistribution of A's 560 on the basis of No. 2 

 preference among 1 , say, B, C, and D, gave the following 

 results : — 



B, 230; C, 115; D, 115: 



f B 50 : 230 

 Then, as quota-excess 100 : 5G0 :: \ C 25 : 115 



(D25 : 115 

 In this manner each voter has equal power (viz. -J $) in 

 determining the quota-surplus transfer distribution. B appro- 

 priates 50 of the 230 papers having No. 2 against his name; 

 C and I), respectively, appropriate 25 from among the papers 

 similarly having the No. 2 preference against their names. 

 This is a just distribution, and entirely removes the element of 

 chance, so far as the second preference is concerned. A 

 similar provision is made for removing, or rather minimising, 

 the very trifling element of chance in quota-excesses of the 

 second order — i.e., where a former transfer paper may again be 

 transferred to the third or next in order of preference — the 

 determinants in the latter case being the whole of the 

 transferred papers, only, which may have helped to complete a 

 candidate's quota. The process is extremely simple and 

 effective. The only objection to the method is that it may add 

 about 20 per cent, to the work of handling the papers, as in 

 the Hobart election. Where there are no excesses of the first 

 order, as in tfte Launceston election, it may add only about 4 

 per cent, to the work of handling and counting. 



Second Query. — What is the probable total effective value of 

 all surplus votes transferred to candidates in next order 

 of preference in comparison with the totality of all other 

 forms of effective votes ? 



Answer. — It varies considerably, according to the 

 number of quota-excesses of the first and second orders. 

 In Hobart the quota-excess votes of the first order 

 represented 1*25 per cent, of all effective votes. Those of 

 the second order represented 2*29 per cent. All quota- 

 excesses represented 3*54 per cent. In Launceston 

 election the whole of the quota-excess transfer votes only 

 represented 0*66 per cent, of all effective votes. 



Third Query. — Does the Clark-Hare method entirely eliminate 

 the element of chance in the transfer of quota-excesses ? 



Answer. — Yes, entirely, as regards quota-excesses of 

 the first order. As regards transfers of the second order, 

 I estimate that the element of chance for each candidate 

 only represents 0*09 per cent, of all effective votes. This 

 is so trifling an influence that it may be safelv ignored in 

 practice. 



