OF ELECTION IN TASMANIA. 79 



Fourth Query. — What, approximately, are the relative effective 

 values of preference votes 1, "2, 3, and over, in determining 

 the return of any candidate ? 



Answer. — For Hobart, the effective values were as 

 follows : — 



First preference 77*66 per cent. 



Second ditto 20-47 



Third and higher 1*87 



» 



n 



The relative values for Launceston closely agreed with 

 those for Hobart. 



Fifth Query. — Whether is the first count, all effective votes, 

 or the aggregate of all counts (effective and ineffective) 

 the best index of the real measure of favour in which 

 the several candidates stand towards the electorate ? 



Answer. — The aggregate of all counts, whether effective 

 or not, would seem to bo the truer index of the general 

 favour in which each candidate stands, because the 

 numbers polled at the first count may be greatly disturbed 

 by the action of those who are interested in the success of 

 two or more favourites who may be pretty well assured of 

 success, but whose order of preference might by some be 

 altered if sudden rumour suggested fears ibr any one of 

 the favoured group. This accidental action would tend 

 to conceal the true or exact measure of favour in the first 

 count. In the aggregate of effective votes polled the 

 true measure of favour is not quite correctly revealed by 

 the actual numbers recorded as regards successful candi- 

 dates, inasmuch as those who obtain the quota first are 

 by exclusion from poll deprived of the full force of the 

 second, third, and next in order of preference, all of which 

 are received, and swell the volume of the last successful 

 candidate. Thus, the first candidate who polled a quota 

 in Hobart, Sir Philip O. Fysh, was deprived of the latent 

 force of preference, 2, 3, &c. in his favour contained in 

 10 succeeding counts; Mr. Bradley was deprived 

 similarly of the latent force of seven succeeding counts ; 

 Mr. Clark of five. Of the successful candidates, Messrs. 

 Mulcahy, Crisp, and Page alone received the full force of 

 all effective preference votes. The fairer index of the 

 measure of general favour therefore seems to be the 

 aggregate of all preferences, whether effective or non- 

 effective, as shown in one of the appended tables. 



Sixth Query. — What is the effect of the voter's restricting his 

 choice of order of preference to three candidates (the 

 minimum number compulsory by the Tasmanian law)? 



