85 



limited ?ele ctic.D, must remember that it is possible to classify 

 candidates in an order of aversion as well as in an order of pre- 

 fererce. .An entirely different line of argument was taken by one 

 opponent of the Jbill, a gentleman of much zeal and some origi- 

 nality. " Compel an elector to vote for three candidates and it will 

 often end in his choosing as second and third preferences, candi- 

 dates who cannot be raised up as rivals to his first preference. 

 This must prove fatal to the success of the Act.'' The statement 

 is only quoted as illustrating the character of the opposition 

 to which the Bill was occasionally subjected. It would be difficult 

 to suggest a more felicitous example of unreasoning aversion. 

 Second and third preferences can never be employed for the 

 purposes of defeating first preferences; until the fate of the latter 

 has beea determined, no reference to the former is permissible. 



The distribution of the surplus votes is a subject of great 

 importance, and one which remains for consideration. The method 

 adopted in the Tasmanian Bill constitutes its chief claim to the 

 considertion of Home and Foreign statesmen. One may only 

 judge of the value of the means which have been employed by 

 appreciating the difficulties which have been overcome. If a, 

 candidate obtain 2000 votes when the quota is fixed at 1000, 

 1000 ballot papers are available for distribution among the 

 candidates whose names are marked 2. The result of the distri- 

 bution varies according to the principle which determines the 

 appropriation of the papers of the favored candidate. If 

 an analysis of second preferences yield 1000 for Y and a like 

 number for Z, it would be within the power of the leturning 

 officer to effect the election of whichever candidate he preferred. 

 This element of chance has been declared the only really for- 

 midable obstacle to the practical application of Mr Hare's 

 system.* How has the obstacle been overcome in the Tasmanian 

 Act P Mr Clark has suggested a plan at once so simple and 

 so just, that the fact of its novelty must appear incredible. X 

 has a surplus ; bow is it to be distributed ? JSot indiscriminately, 

 nor according to the caprice of the returning officer ; but in a 

 proportion determined by reference to the second votes on the 

 whole of X's papers ; or, as was at first suggested, on the whole 

 of the electorate. For the purposes of this calculation, a 

 candidate marked 3 is credited with a second vote if the candidate 

 marked 2 had obtained his quota before the distribution in 

 question had been commenced. In the case already suggested, 

 of the lOOOexcess votes, ST and Z alike secure 500. In one re- 

 spect the plan involves a slight departure from the scheme of Mr 

 Hare, who proposed to confine the influence of the elector to a 

 single transferable vote. In the case already suggested, X's 

 constituents not only return their chosen candidate, but also 

 have a voice in the distribution of his surplus votes. Such a 

 voice might almost be described as the fraction of a vote. 

 While it is difficult to see any serious objection to this 

 departure, its merit is clear. The element ot chance ceases 

 to exist. 



So far we have only considered the case of a surplus arising 

 from the first count, and, therefore, without the aid of votes 

 transferred from other candidates. After every surplus of this 

 * " Essays and Lectures," H. and M. G. Faweett, 1872 



