74 QUOTA IN PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION, 



The five highest numbers (five being the number of vacancies 

 to be filled) are then arranged in order of magnitude, as fol- 

 lows : — 



8000 (List No. 1). 

 7500 (List No. 2). 

 4500 (List No. 3). 

 400O (List No. 1). 

 3750 (List No. 2), 



The lowest of these numbers^ 3750, is called the " common 

 divisor," or the " electoral quotient," and forms the base on 

 which the seats are allotted. The number of votes obtained 

 by each of the lists is divided by the common divisor, thus : — 



8000 divided by 3750 = 2 with a remainder of 500. 



7500 „ 3750 = 2. 



4500 „ 3750 = 1 „ „ 750. 



The first list contains the electoral quotient twice, the second 

 twice, and the third once, and the five seats are allotted 

 accordingly. Each party obtains one representative for every 

 quota of voters which it can rally to its support; all fractions 

 of "quotas" are disregarded, and all seats are disposed of at 

 the first distribution. 



The method of determining the electoral quotient may 

 appear at first sight rather empirical, but the rule is merely 

 the arithmetical expression, in a form conv^enient for return- 

 ing officers, of the following train of reasoning : The three 

 lists with 8000, 7500, and 4500 supporters are competing for 

 seats. The first seat has to be allotted ; to which list is it to 

 go? Plainly to the list with 8000 supporters. Then the 

 second seat has to be disposed of; to which list is it to go? 

 If it is given to the first list, then the supporters of the first 

 list will have two members in all, or one member for each 

 4000 votes. This would be unfair while 7500 supporters of 

 the second list are unrepresented, therefore the second seat 

 is allotted to the list with 7500 supporters. Similar reason- 

 ing will give the third seat to the list with 4500 supporters, the 

 fourth to the list with 8000 supporters (which now will rightly 

 have one representative for each 4000), and the fifth to the 

 list with 7500. The question in each case is to what list 

 must the seat be allotted in such a way that no one group 

 of unrepresented electors is larger than a represented group. 

 The separate allotment of seats one by one in accordance with 

 the foregoing reasoning may be shown thus : — 



8000 (List No. 1). 

 7500 (List No. 2). 

 4500 (List No. 3). 

 4000 (List No. 1). 

 3750 (List No. 2). 



This result, of course, agrees with that obtained by the 

 official process of dividing the total of each list by the 

 electoral quotient. 



The d'Hondt rule certainly accomplishes its purpose. It 

 furnishes a measuring rod by which to measure off from each 

 total of votes the number of seats won by the list. But the 

 d'Hondt rule is not without its critics. As in the earlier 

 Swiss methods objection was taken to the undue favouring of 

 certain fractions, so in Belgium, objection is taken to the fact 



