been referred to as putting an end to the lobster can- 

 ning industry in Maine. 



The method of measuring lobsters remained un- 

 changed until 1907 when a carapace measure of 4% in. 

 from the end of the nose to the center rear of the body 

 shell was established as the minimum legal size. 



The legislature of 1903 made provision for the 

 purchase of eggbearing lobsters by the state for con- 

 servation and propagation purposes. From 20,000 to 

 40,000 pounds of seeders are annually purchased for 

 planting in Maine waters in addition to the several 

 thousand required for the operation of the hatchery and 

 rearing station. 



The increasing importance of the industry and the 

 need for control measures over the resource led to the 

 establishment of licensing provisions in 1915 for lob- 

 ster fishermen, dealers, and transporters. From the 

 handful of commercial lobster fishermen operating 

 during the middle 1800's the number had grown to 

 3,000 in 1915. 



Under a provision of the laws of 1919, a new method 

 of measuring lobsters was enacted. The minimum legal 

 size was established at iVi in. measured from the eye 

 socket to the nearest point at the rear of the body shell. 



Subsequent legislation defined in detail the method 

 for carapace measurement, from the rear of the eye 

 socket on a line parallel to the center line of the body 

 shell to the rear of the body shell. 



On the assumption that large lobsters constituted a 

 more desirable breeding stock, the so-called double- 

 gauge lobster measure became law in 1933. The 

 minimum legal size was defined as 3Vi6 in. and the 

 maximum as 4% in. In 1935, the maximum legal limit 

 was raised to 5 in. and, in 1942, the minimum legal 

 limit was raised to Ws in. 



No additional changes in size regulations were made 

 until 1957. A minimum size of 3 ^/le in. was passed by 

 the Legislature in that year, as was a temporary max- 

 imum of 5^/i6 in. which reverted to 5 in. on 1 January 

 1960. The minimum size law of 1957 conformed to that 

 enacted by Massachusetts and to regulations adopted 

 for most Canadian fishing areas a few years earlier and 

 thus provided a degree of uniformity in the regulation 

 of the fishery. 



B. Economic Impact of Some Selected 

 Alternative Management Schemes. 



We shall consider the economic impact of five alter- 

 native policies that could be adopted to manage the 

 Maine inshore American lobster fishery. These man- 

 agement strategies assume that some central authority 

 (i.e., states) could impose these regulations. Further, 

 the following strategies are meant to be illustrative and 

 do not exhaust all possible alternatives. Also, two 

 other management strategies suggested by Reeves 

 (1969) and Sinclair (1960) will be reviewed. As other 

 management strategies are suggested by industry, 

 government, and the academic community, the model 



formulated above may be used to predict their impact. 

 The specific objectives of these management 

 strategies will be discussed below. All strategies have 

 two common objectives: (1) to protect the resource 

 from overexploitation and (2) to allow maximum free- 

 dom for operators to function in a free enterprise fash- 

 ion. 



a. Freeze on existing (1969) fishing effort by placing 

 a license fee on traps. Under this scheme, the regula- 

 tory authority would calculate a license fee on traps 

 which would keep the level of fishing effort constant 

 despite an increase in the demand for lobsters. A 

 license fee should not be levied on the individual ves- 

 sel because this would not control the number of traps 

 fished per vessel. The increased cost of operations due 

 to the license fee would make it uneconomical for ves- 

 sels to enter the fishery even if ex-vessel prices had 

 increased. In essence, the license fee would siphon off 

 increased revenue (or profits) from an increase in ex- 

 vessel prices, assuming the latter increases faster than 

 the cost of operations. For purposes of illustration, let 

 us assume that we desire to manage the inshore lobster 

 fishery commencing in 1974. Given the trends in U.S. 

 population, personal income, consumer prices, lobster 

 imports, and other domestic production to the year 

 1974, it would be necessary to place an estimated an- 

 nual license fee of $2.27 on each lobster trap fished in 

 order to keep fishing effort at its 1969 level as indicated 

 in Table 25. The regulatory authority would collect 

 approximately $1.93 million in license fees which 

 could be used to finance resource research, enforce- 

 ment, and surveillance. 



The bioeconomic model discussed above (Section 

 V-A and Appendix A) was used to estimate the neces- 

 sary license fee. It should be emphasized that these 

 calculations are merely rough estimates and only serve 

 to give the reader some idea of the magnitude of such 

 taxation. The illustrative tax is also based upon an 

 extrapolation of trends 5 yr ahead of 1969. If we did 

 nothing, it is estimated that the catch would be lower 

 and more fishermen and traps would be employed in 

 the fishery by 1974. Obviously, the situation would 

 worsen as demand for lobsters expanded and the re- 

 source became increasingly overfished. 



The license fee plan does, however, have many dis- 

 advantages. First, a license fee on traps fished does 

 not really get at the utilization rate. One might expect 

 that a license fee on an individual trap might induce 

 fishermen to fish each trap more intensively and 

 thereby reduce their number of traps. At this point, we 

 do not have any information on utilization rates 

 whereby the license fee could be adjusted upward if 

 utilization increased. Second, enforcement and sur- 

 veillance might be difficult along the coastline from 

 Maine to North Carolina. Third, and most important, 

 the quantitative tools and projected figures needed to 

 calculate a tax are at best crude and would have to be 

 used each year for computation of the license fee. 



b. Reduce the existing level of fishing effort to that 



30 



