injury to hands. In California, this type of personal injury 

 occupied the second position, with 32 percent of losses, while 

 foot injuries claimed 35 percent and body injuries 2k percent. 

 The marked severity of hand injuries in New England will be linked, 

 in the following chapter, with the importance of the hijman element. 



Claims for orgaxiic diseases which may or may not be considered 

 an occupational hazard accounted for 52 percent of losses paid for 

 sickness in New England and 70 percent in California (table 17). It 

 is highly significant that multiple diseases ajid poisoning may also 

 be considered, to a large degree, a nonoccupational hazard. In fact, 

 as much as two-thirds or more of losses for sickness are paid for 

 diseases ■vAich may not be considered occupational hazards under 

 ordinary conditions. 



Accidents of officer personnel are less severe than their 

 frequency of occurrence indicates since only 11 percent of losses 

 were paid for in such accidents in New England, and 6 percent in 

 Cstlifomia (table 17). Finally, the amount of loss per claim 

 seems to increase with the age of the injured person (table 17). 



C. WHAT LIES BEHIND ACCIDENT OCCURRENCE 



1. The problem of causation . The previous classifications of 

 hvill eind protection and indemnity insurance accidents may be con- 

 sidered an approach to a systematic ajialysis of claim records. Yet, 

 classification of accidents touches only the surface, and the problem 

 of attributing an accident to a specific cause or causes becomes 

 formidable, indeed. 



Most accidents are the cumulative effect of many elements, 

 physical or hvmian, which contribute to the occurrence of an accident, 

 in varying degrees. For example, it was found that most hull acci- 

 dents are the resvat of navigation hazard. But what or who was 

 responsible for the navigation hazard? What lies behind the ob- 

 scure phrase "struck submerged object"? Did the vessel actually 

 hit a submerged object? Or should the accident be attributed, at 

 least partially, to poor vessel construction, poor maintenance, 

 stormy weather, or to a combination of all these conditions? And 

 if, by chance, all or most of these conditions had been present, 

 could not the accident have been avoided if the captain were a 

 competent navigator, the engineer better trained, or the whole 

 crew well disciplined and more accident conscious? There is 

 practically no end to this chain of questions. 



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