A leading insurer from the same 6urea describes his futile 

 attempt to reduce accidents from fire hazard as follows: "Several 

 years ago most boats were carrying small hand fire extinguishers 

 inside the engine room, which was Just where most fires started. 

 Two years ago, our company began to require placement of the 

 extinguisher outside the engine room door. But that was not 

 satisfactory either. A man would reach around the door, start 

 the extinguisher discharging, then toss it into the middle of 

 the fire and abandon ship." Of covurse, the captain, as the 

 vessel's master, must share the greatest part of the responsi- 

 bility, but not infrequently accidents occur because of the 

 engineer"s and crew's lack of training and discipline or negli- 

 gence. For example, considering "don't know" as a negative 

 answer, only 8 percent of the insured vessels in New England 

 were manned by a licensed engineer, none in the Gulf Area, and 

 20 percent in California (table A-I6 in Appendix A). 



The captain's lack of appreciation for accident-prevention 

 devices may reach the point of removing previously installed 

 safety devices. A New England incident is quite illustrative . 

 A vessel operator purchased from the United States Government 

 several steel vessels, previously used in Germany. The captains 

 requested a number of changes on the vessels, among which wajs 

 removal of railings around the bollards and the automatic cable 

 guide on the winch which the Germans had installed for the safety 

 of the crews. Reportedly, the excuse for the removal of these 

 safety devices was that the railings were in the way and hindered 

 operations and that the automatic cable guide on the winch would 

 not work satisfactorily for the type of fishing in which the 

 vessels were to be engaged. 



Incidents such as the above, which demonstrate the importemt 

 contribution of the human element to conditions which might give 

 rise to the frequent occurrence and severity of either hull or 

 protection and indemnity insurance claims, axe numerous. The 

 following is a list, by no means exhaustive, of similar practices 

 which further illustrate the extent of ignorance and negligence 

 on the part of the captain, the engineer, and the crew: poor 

 vessel keeping; carelessness in the maintenance of equipment; 

 failure on the part of the captain, mate, and engineer to spend 

 sufficient time on safety training sessions with the crew; 

 failure to train new men in the proper handling of the fishing 

 gear and fishing equipment; unclean and slippery conditions of 

 decks £uid the engine room; overloaded or poorly insulated circuits; 

 use of gasoline in wood-burning stoves to start fires more quickly 

 in cold weather; failure to check fuel tanks periodically against 



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