low premiums charged rather than to large claim losses. For the 

 sake of comparison, for every 10 policy years studied in New 

 England there vrere I9 claims totaling $12,550 losses, while in 

 California these fig-ures were 2 and $6,270, respectively. The 

 leirger average losses per claim in California are the result of 

 larger deductibles for personal injuries and to a relative 

 absence of small or petty claims rather than an indication of 

 severity of losses. Furthermore, within the New England Area 

 the centers of the protection emd indemnity insurance problem 

 are located in the Massachusetts ports where organized labor is 

 strongest; namely, Boston and New Bedford principally and, to a 

 lesser extent, in Gloucester (Cf. table 20 and discussion in text). 



The concentration of the problem in the New England strongholds 

 of organized labor is not a mere coincidence and requires further 

 explanation. The relative absence of the problem in other New 

 England ports and in the other two areas can be partly explained 

 In terras of the close personal relations between vessel owner and 

 crew. I^Jhen a vessel is operated by a kinship group or when re- 

 lations are intimately personal as a result of crew loyalty to a 

 captain-owner, the likelihood that a creimian \t±11 talie advantage 

 of legal provisions for an accident is very small indeed, almost 

 nonexistent. In fact, this situation iras a primary factor for 

 noninsurance in all three areas, especiaJLly in the Gulf Area, and 

 largely explains the almost complete absence of the problem in several 

 specific ports. Furthermore, lack of knowledge of the advantages 

 offered by the law, a sense of being part of the venture and sharing 

 its fruits, moral and ethical standards associated with professional 

 pride, fear of ostracism by fellow fishermen, and other similar 

 traditionalistic ways of doing things seem to account for the 

 absence of the problem in many ports in spite of depersonalized 

 relations between vessel owner and crew. Nor was the presence of 

 organized labor in itself found to be an important factor as long 

 as relations with management were amicable. It is the attitudes 

 and the conduct of labor which count most for the unprofitable 

 loss experience of protection and indemnity insurers. 



The adverse effect of attitudes and conduct of organized labor 

 has come from many quarters. Maritime legislation, declining earn- 

 ings from fish landings, probable encouragement by lawyers, doctors, 

 and union officials, and extraordinarily large awards by courts 

 have been responsible along \7ith conditions closely related to 

 fishing operations. Labor shortage has been one. Here is how a 

 marine surveyor described the labor situation in New England: "The 

 labor situation is such that you have to hire unskilled help, and ■ 

 unskilled help invariably gets in trouble . Scallopers have the 

 most difficulty in hiring experienced help. Experienced fishermen 

 call scalloping 'farming' and do not like to do it. Scalloper 

 crews generally have no moral standards. Any injury and they 

 get themselves a lawyer." Some owners have contributed to the 

 problem by encouraging their crews to go to court. A previous 

 quotation is also appropriate in this instance. "I pay plenty 

 for insurance. Go aheaxi and collect what you can. The insurance 



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