MancJiester Memoirs, Vol. liv. (1910), No. 14. 



XIV. The Physical Aspect of Time. 



By H. Bateman, ma. 



Received Alay ^1 d, igio. 



I. During recent j^ears mathematicians and philoso- 

 phers have been much occupied in analysing the 

 fundamental conceptions on which the different sciences 

 are based, with the result that many things which were 

 formerly regarded as quite simple and axiomatic can 

 no longer be regarded as such. The tendency has, of 

 course, been to make definitions as precise as possible, 

 and to make descriptions of phenomena approximate to 

 reality as we know it, and not to a preconceived idea of 

 what the description ought to be. 



Many difficulties arise, however, in a careful examina- 

 tion of the fundamental concepts of any science, and this 

 is soon found to be the case when we commence to 

 examine the ideas of space and time which are fundamental 

 in all physical and metaphysical enquiries. 



In the case of time, for instance, it is found that we 

 have to examine the connection between time as it is known 

 to us by the mind's experience, i.e., psychological time, 

 and time as it is measured by the course of physical 

 phenomena, i.e., physical time. 



With regard to psychological time, it has been con- 

 tested that it is purely qualitative, in other words that 

 we are quite unable to decide intuitively whether two 

 intervals of time are equal or not.* This means that 



*See for instance Poinccire, " La \'aleur de la Science," cii. II. 

 June i^ih, igio. 



