ANIMAL PSYCHOLOGY. 259 



of external things^ through the organs of sense, it has 

 been denied that they are able to make a rational use 

 of the perceptions thus obtained. Their acts, in in- 

 numerable instances, are seen to be acts of intelligence 

 and knowledge, such as a man would perform under 

 similar circumstances, and yet, there is an unwilling- 

 ness to recognize in them the results of deliberate pro- 

 cesses of reasoning, followed by an exercise of the 

 will. A large class, it is true, acknowledge some reas- 

 oning powers in the mutes, but under such qualifica- 

 tions, lipaitations, and restrictions, that, in effect, it 

 denies to them the possession of a free intelligence. 

 The real c|uestion is practically evaded. Their acts 

 should be tested by the same analysis which is applied 

 to human acts, and full credence be given to the re- 

 sults. As we cannot place ourselves in personal con- 

 nection with the animal mind and thus obtain their 

 testimony concerning their mental processes, we are 

 remitted to their personal acts. Upon these, however, 

 a judgment can be formed as definitely as one man 

 can pronounce upon the act of another man. While 

 this method is not as irrefragable as an appeal to 

 consciousness, it is one upon which mankind act 

 implicitly in their own affairs. 



'' Reason," says Abercrombie, "consists in comparing 

 and weighing facts, considerations, and motives, and 

 deducing from them conclusions, both as principles of 

 belief and rules of conduct " * * * * "It is the 

 exercise of mind by which we compare facts with 

 each other, and mental impressions with external 

 things." There are many simple forms of reasoning; 

 such as the relation of cause and effect; the compari- 

 son of one fact with another, and drawing an inference 



