APPENDIX A XXIX 



join them. Mobs attacked peaceable citizens, destroyed their furniture, 

 smashed their windows, painted their cattle, and maltreated them per- 

 sonally in the most cruel and heartless manner. The whole community 

 became so terrorized that the disloyal had their own way, until after the 

 arrival of the British troops. Then, when it was too late, the Loyalists 

 had a chance to organize, but even then they were handicapped by the 

 extraordinary inefficiency and want of judgment of the British 

 authorities. 



Van Tyne says that many of the Loyalists would gladly have taken 

 up arms when General Hovv^e arrived with his army, " but were deterred 

 *'' by the lack of encouragement," and he goes on to say, " The British 

 " clung stubbornly to the idea that these provincials could not fight, 

 ''' and only encouraged their services in the regular army, where they 

 '• might be trained by British officers. It took several years to recognize 

 '' their value as provincial militia." Van Tyne adds that afterwards 

 v.hen it was too late, loyalist assistance was encouraged, and that about 

 50,000 soldiers altogether were drawn into the struggle, from the 

 American sympathizers. 



History repeats itself ! In South Africa, in the early part of the 

 war, the local volunteers were discouraged, and in some instances, it 

 is said, disbanded and sent to their homes, the feeling being that they 

 would be rather a hindrance than a help. A few defeats led to the call 

 for the assistance of provincials, not only from all the South African 

 colonies, but from all the great colonies. What a blessing it was for 

 our Empire, that foreign intervention had not been encouraged in the 

 interval, by the severe losses that our army sustained. 



General Howe not only refused loyalist help, but he frittered 

 away a whole winter in Philadelphia, wasting his time in dissipation 

 and social entertaiiftnents, while Washington was at Valley Forge, only 

 a day's march away, holding the dispirited remnants of his army together 

 with the utmost difficulty. Howe could have scattered the rebel forces, 

 and probably ended the war in two or three days by one well-planned, 

 decisive action.- 



Professor Tyler gives a vivid picture of the incapacity of General 

 Howe. He says : — 



" It is well known that Sir Wm. Howe, having, in his rather tardy 

 " campaign for that year, gained, almost in spite of himself, a brief 

 " succession of victories over the American rebels, then forbore to take 

 " advantage of people thus fallen through his agency into depressed 

 " circumstances, and finding Philadelphia an extremely agreeable place 

 " of repose for a warrior who had already had enough of war for that 

 " particular season, he concluded to settle himself do\\Ti in that gracious 



