266 ROYAL SOCIETY OF CANADA 



" that justly great attempt," " so promising an enterpdse," and so 

 forth. I have therefore applied the phrase "The Glorious Enterprise" 

 to the traditional plan itself. The is/sue was plainly put in such phrases 

 as that of Caleh Heathcote, "it is impossible that we and the French 

 can both inhabit this continent in peace/' and " until the tryall is over 

 and 'tis known whether North America must belong to the French or us.'' 

 Its essential features were (1) combined action by all the British 

 colonies; (2) a fleet attacking Quebec; (3)) an army making a support- 

 ing attack on Montreal by way of Lake Champlain; (4) the assistance 

 of the Iroquois. As first conceived, it was indeed a bold and original 

 design, aiming at the almost nndreamt-of. And even towards the 

 end it contrasted strongly in its comprehensive simplicity with the 

 confused projects concerning the war in America among which the 

 English military groped about. We loiow that the scheme failed in 

 1690. ITihe d.etermining cause then was the outbreak of smallpox 

 among the Indians at the foot of Lake Champlain, which relieved 

 Count Frontenac from the fear of an invasion of Montreal, and left 

 him free to withstand the naval attack of Phips upon Quebec. In 

 1711, it failed again, through the cowardice and incompetence of Sir 

 Hovenden Walker and General Hill in the Gulf of St. Lawrence. (The 

 cause of its revival in the end was the utter failure of other plans of 

 campaign, such as Shirley's against the Lake forts; Braddack's against 

 the posts on the Ohio; and Abercromby's against Tiiconderoga. A 

 great disaster was impending over the British colonies — their forces 

 were exhausted, the Indian allies were on the eve of going aver to the 

 enemy, and the outlook was turning seriously in favour of a French 

 future for America. Another generation of growth for the population 

 of the New France, together with a rush of immigration from Old 

 France into the West, and a people would have grown up firmly rooted 

 in Canada like a nation of Europe, who might perhaps have been 

 temporarily overrun, but whose permanent conquest would have been 

 very doubtful. Tihe " tryall " was still in the balance " wliether North 

 America must belong to the French or us," and was in danger of being 

 finally decided, not in favour of the British. 



■.Tiwo men, at least, knew what was needed in that critical hour. 

 One was James de Lancey, Lieutenant-Governor of New York, who set 

 forth in clear terms to the Lords of iTirade the o-nly mean? " to distress 

 the French in Canada"; but, althoug'h he had some influence in England, 

 he well knew that no colanial adviser was of sufficient weight to move 

 fleets and armies by any direct action of his own, in the then state of 

 mind towards provincials of tlie titled incompetents ruling at London. 

 iThe other was De Lancey's friend, Thomas Pownall, Governor of 

 Massachusetts and Lieutenant-Governor of New Jersey, brother of the 



