ON CAPE BEBTOK 23S 



fleet aud array could proceed with greater security to the siege of the capital of Canada, 

 on whose rocky heights the French believed themselves almost impregnable. 



Whilst Louisbourg had been in the possession of the English until the peace of Aix- 

 la-Chapelle, they had repaired the breai-hes in the walls besides erecting a large wooden 

 barracks in the Queen's bastion, but it does not appear that they strengthened the fortifi- 

 cations in any essential respects. When the French regained possession of the town, 

 the engineer Franquet was sent out by the government of France for the purpose of mak- 

 ing it more capable to resist the attack which they knew must be made upon it some time 

 or another. An additional battery of twenty guns was erected at Point Rochefort, and 

 another at the lighthouse to command the shipping and assist the island battery in pro- 

 tecting the entrance to the harbo^^r. Both of these defences had been contemplated in the 

 original plan of the works, but they were not constructed when Louisbourg was first 

 besieged by the New England troops. The original plan also contemplated a battery of 

 fifteen guns near the entrance, to the southwest of the careening cove, but it does not 

 appear to have been built before the second siege. Between the Maurepas and Princess 

 bastions there was constructed a curtain of masonry and another between the Princess 

 and the Queen's bastion as those were relatively weak portions of the defences. It may be 

 that Franquet was not well qualified to perform the task assigned to him, but at all events 

 there is some probability in the accusation which French writers have made that there 

 was great neglect on the part of the officers in charge of the works, as well as peculation 

 practiced by the otficials generally.' On the whole, we may come to the conclusion that 

 while there were doubtless defects in the fortifications, from the causes just stated, it is 

 quite certain that they were in a much better condition to stand a prolonged siege than in 

 1745. The fortifications were well defended by cannon and mortars, and there was a large 

 fleet in the port and a considerable force of regular soldiers and militia in the town, 

 although, as the issue proved, the whole strength of Louisbourg was quite unequal to 

 keep up a defence for any length of time against the military skill which led the English 

 army and fleet. Had France been able to cope with England on the sea, Louisbourg 

 might never have fallen and Canada have been saved to France, or, at all events, it would 

 not have passed so easily into the possession of England. The fleets that were intended 

 for the relief of Canada were intercepted and defeated by the naval skill and indomitable 

 courage of the English sailors. The incompetency and pusillanimity shown by Hol- 

 bourne, when it was contemplated to attack Louisbourg in 1757, were very rare in Eng- 

 lish naval annals. Indeed, Admiral Byng was sacrificed to the public opinion of the day 

 that if English sailors were beaten there must be gross negligence or cowardice, only to 

 be wiped out by disgrace and death. In 1757, Admiral Osborn prevented a French fleet 

 from passing through the Straits of Gibraltar on its way to America, while Admiral 

 Hawke forced another, just sailing to Louisbourg, to find protection under the guns of 

 the fort of Aix and in the shallow waters of the Charente. Had these naval expeditions 

 reached Canada, Quebec and Louisbourg might have long resisted the attacks of the Eng- 

 lish naval and military forces, but happily for Boscawen and Amherst, only a few ships 

 had arrived at Louisbourg before the English fleet anchored in Gabarus Bay at daybreak 

 on the 2nd of June. 



' See the very unfavonrable estimate of Franquet ami the officials generally in a memoir attributed to a Scotch 

 soldier of fortune, Chevalier Johnstone— App. IX to thi.s work. 



