ON CAPE BEETON. 24S 



and of a fleet of at least fifty war vessels, tlie uoblest that ever appeared iu American 

 waters ; with officers thoroughly trained in the use of artillery, and with a great store of 

 all the machinery and munitions of war necessary to the reduction of a fortified town. 

 In the other case, we see a relatively insignificant body of men, a little over four thousand 

 all told, without regular military training, unskilled in siege operations, poorly provided 

 with cannou, tents and stores, perfectly ignorant of the use of heavy artillery, and led by 

 men taken from the counting house and farm. These colonial troops were supported by 

 a few small vessels of their own, and an English squadron which consisted of only four 

 vessels at the commencement and did not exceed nine vessels, in('luding the captured 

 Vigilante, at the close of the siege. It is true that in 1745 the walls were not iu as good 

 condition to undergo a protracted siege, and the French garrison was chiefly composed of 

 colonial militia. Duchambon had no fleet to assist him, but it must be admitted that with 

 the exception of the Aréthuse the vessels in the harbour in 1758 were of no material aid 

 to Drucour. Still despite the great odds in favour of the second expedition the siege 

 lasted for as many days as that conducted by Colonel Pepperrell. M. Drucour was a 

 more efficient commander than Duchambon and had the assistance of a fine body of officers 

 and regular troops, and was able to prolong the siege much longer than the other could 

 possibly have done under the circumstances. The weather too was favourable for the 

 success of the colonial expedition, but curious enough during the progress of the second 

 siege it was remarkable for rain, fog, and wind. However, despite the good fortune that 

 attended the effijrts of the colonists in this and other respects, their success deserves men- 

 tion among the most nnnarkable enterprises of the war. If we compare the operations 

 during the tw-o sieges, it will be seen that Amherst and Wolfe closely followed, whenever 

 possible, the same plan of attack that was ado^ited so successfully in 1745. The siege of 

 1758 was conducted with that scientific skill and precision which were necessarily want- 

 ing in 1745, but the scheme of attack against the King's and Dauphin's bastions was on 

 the same basis as that of the first siege and led to similar results. It is on record that 

 Wolfe's operations at Lighthouse Point and at Lorembec were in accord with the sugges- 

 tions made in 1757 to the British government by one of the officers who took a prominent 

 part in Pepperrell's expedition.' 



The capture of Louisbourg was but the prelude to a series of events which gave 

 Canada to England, and Louisiana for some years to Spain, and laid the foundations of 

 the United States of America and of the Dominion of Canada. These events are inscribed 

 in letters of gold on the pages which relate the triumphs of the administration of Pitt. 

 Abercromby was beaten at Ticonderoga, and Lord Howe, described by a great statesman 

 as " a character of ancient times and a complete model of military virtue," - met an 

 untimely, though a soldier's, death at Lake George. On the other hand, Forbes drove 

 the French from the valley of the Ohio, and Bradstreet, whose services are mentioned in 

 a previous page, won Frontenac and gave to the English the control of Lake Ontario. 

 After the conquest of Cape Breton the English took possession of St. John's Island, and 

 the greater part of its inhabitants were sent to France. Wolfe destroyed the French 

 settlements on the bays of Graspé, Miramichi and Chaleurs, and when he had completed 



' Samuel Waldo to the Rt. Hon. W. Pitt. See Can. Arcliives for 1886 p. clii. For references to tlio authorities 

 on tlie operations of 1758, see App. IX and X to this work. 

 » H. Grenville, " Correspondence," i. 262. 



