APPENDIX 425 



ical, as if the animals' conduct was in particular instances not 

 the direct result of mental reasoning, but as if they performed 

 reasonable actions mechanically. But in other instances we 

 are compelled to admit that, after fully considering the parti- 

 cular circumstances, they do what is best for the future and 

 for the common weal. 



If we suppose, for example, that the collection of honey 

 has become mechanical, that the bees no longer reason con- 

 sciously in performing this labour, yet we must assume that 

 originally they began to collect honey from reflection and 

 reasoning ; for otherwise they would never have come to do 

 it mechanically. We can also say, on the other hand, that 

 by inheritance actions originally due to reason have gradually 

 become mechanical, automatic, instinctive, so that the animals 

 continue to practise them mechanically as the inheritance of 

 aojes. It mif^ht be thouo^ht that to recrard the social life of 

 the bees in this way as merely mechanical degrades it in our 

 estimation. But such a judgment would be mistaken. Since 

 these actions are performed automatically, the animals are 

 left free to exert themselves in other ways : they have time, 

 opportunity, and energy to a^^ply their mental activity in 

 other directions ; and we can even see in the development of 

 such a state of things the ideal condition of the state, since 

 the individual performs his part for the good of the whole 

 more and more mechanically, and as a matter of course, and 

 is no longer compelled to consider on each occasion whether 

 he must do it, and how. 



Eegarding the phenomena in this way, we see a marvellous 

 unity resulting from the combination and co-operation of the 

 mental activities of separate units, since these now work for 

 the good of the community in a perfectly constant manner, 

 like the parts of a machine. 



Let us consider yet another side of the question. I said 



