434 , APPENDIX 



in which the good continues to live through the effort of the 

 individual, through the improvement of the offspring. 



This conception disdains the idea of doing good for the 

 sake of reward ; it desires to do it for its own sake, for the 

 benefit of all. Good, however, is not something prescribed 

 from without; we call only that the good wdiich is serviceable 

 to the common wellbeing, and because it has become service- 

 able to the common wellbeing. 



Only so far as is not inconsistent with the good of all will 

 the individual put forth his might in the struggle for 

 existence. 



He must ever keep this in view if he will avoid injuring 

 himself. 



For even the utility principle does not demand brute 

 strength throughout, but leaves room for universal love, the 

 action of which, as reason tells the individual, will always 

 reflect back upon himself. 



Thus our conception leads not only to the complete recog- 

 nition of the rights of our neighbour, but also to the most 

 complete subordination in family and state. 



It is the most uncompromising opponent of that confused 

 idea of freedom so injurious to the common good which 

 claims unlimited independence for the individual. 



It takes in some sense the social life of the bees for its 

 model, in which the work of the individual for the com- 

 munity has become automatic action. 



And that in our civilised life we act to some extent in this 

 way may be proved by the fact that we have come in ordin- 

 ary morals to regard the good as something absolute, univer- 

 sally admitted, to make the conscience responsible for its 

 violation, and to strive tow^ards the ideal. 



If the thinking man whose mental vision sees the infinite 

 multitude of worlds, or if the student of nature is questioned 

 concerning our position and significance in the universe 



