22 ROYAL SOCIETY OF CANADA 
public measures. The movement for a remodelling of the senate, how- 
ever, has not yet taken any definite shape, and is not likely to do so so 
long as the present Conservative government remains in power, although 
the writer is one of those who believe that it ought soon to be strength- 
ened by giving it a more representative character, on some such plan as 
has been suggested in the case of legislative councils in the provinces. Of 
course no constitutional changes can be made in the body except on an 
address of the two houses to the crown. The British North America Act 
does not allow an unrestricted use of the royal prerogative in case of a 
deadlock between the two houses, since it provides for the appointment of 
only six senators at the most. When,some years ago, the Liberal govern- 
ment attempted to make use of this constitutional provision, they were 
rebuked by the imperial authorities on the ground that the circumstances 
did not justify an addition to the senate at that time. With this prece- 
dent before them, it will be always difficult for a government to increase 
their strength in this way. 
With experience of the Canadian senate and their own legislative 
councils before them the framers of the proposed Australian federation 
have followed the example of the United States and provided for a 
senate whose members are elected for six years by the legislatures of the 
colonies—or parliaments of the Australian states, as they are more am- 
bitiously called in the bill. The constitutional provisions that govern 
the house of lords, and the Canadian senate with respect to the initiation 
or amendment of taxation, and annual appropriation bills are fully 
recognized in the Australian draft. Some enlargement of power is, 
however, given to the new house in the case of money bills and it is per- 
mitted at any stage to return any proposed law, which they may not 
amend, with a message requesting the omission or amendment of any 
items or provisions therein. This practice seems to have been followed 
for some years in South Australia, but in introducing it into their pro- 
posed constitution the convention appears to have been largely influenced 
by a hope that it would give the upper house greater power and also 
some resemblance to the senate of the United States. But they have 
forgotten that that great body has long wielded the three elements of 
authority—executive, legislative and judicial. It goes into executive 
session on treaties and appointments made by the president, acts as a 
court of impeachment for the president and high functionaries, and 
exercises the supreme legislative power of directly amending money 
bills. Until the popular assemblies in Australia are able or willing to 
give such sovereign powers to an upper house, it is idle to talk of com- 
parisons with the senate of an independent federal republic. 
No doubt the members of the Australian convention hope that a 
senate with a longer tenure of power, and an indirect method of popular 
election, will be to a considerable degree more conservative in its legisla- 
